The core of the games with fractional linear utility functions
Optimization and Control
2013-03-29 v1
Abstract
We consider fractional linear programming production games for the single-objective and multiobjective cases. We use the method of Chakraborty and Gupta (2002) in order to transform the fractional linear programming problems into linear programming problems. A cooperative game is attached and we prove the non-emptiness of the core by using the duality theory from the linear programming. In the multiobjective case, we give a characterization of the Stable outcome of the associate cooperative game, which is balanced. We also consider the cooperative game associated to an exchange economy with a finite number of agents.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1303.7041,
title = {The core of the games with fractional linear utility functions},
author = {Monica Patriche},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1303.7041},
year = {2013}
}
Comments
15 pages