Rethinking Split Manufacturing: An Information-Theoretic Approach with Secure Layout Techniques

Split manufacturing is a promising technique to defend against fab-based malicious activities such as IP piracy, overbuilding, and insertion of hardware Trojans. However, a network flow-based proximity attack, proposed by Wang et al. (DAC'16) [1], has demonstrated that most prior art on split manufacturing is highly vulnerable. Here in this work, we present two practical layout techniques towards secure split manufacturing: (i) gate-level graph coloring and (ii) clustering of same-type gates. Our approach shows promising results against the advanced proximity attack, lowering its success rate by 5.27x, 3.19x, and 1.73x on average compared to the unprotected layouts when splitting at metal layers M1, M2, and M3, respectively. Also, it largely outperforms previous defense efforts; we observe on average 8x higher resilience when compared to representative prior art. At the same time, extensive simulations on ISCAS'85 and MCNC benchmarks reveal that our techniques incur an acceptable layout overhead. Apart from this empirical study, we provide---for the first time---a theoretical framework for quantifying the layout-level resilience against any proximity-induced information leakage. Towards this end, we leverage the notion of mutual information and provide extensive results to validate our model.