As a practical privacy-preserving learning method, split learning has drawn much attention in academia and industry. However, its security is constantly being questioned since the intermediate results are shared during training and inference. In this paper, we focus on the privacy leakage from the forward embeddings of split learning. Specifically, since the forward embeddings contain too much information about the label, the attacker can either use a few labeled samples to fine-tune the top model or perform unsupervised attacks such as clustering to infer the true labels from the forward embeddings. To prevent such kind of privacy leakage, we propose the potential energy loss to make the forward embeddings become more 'complicated', by pushing embeddings of the same class towards the decision boundary. Therefore, it is hard for the attacker to learn from the forward embeddings. Experiment results show that our method significantly lowers the performance of both fine-tuning attacks and clustering attacks.
@article{arxiv.2210.09617,
title = {Protecting Split Learning by Potential Energy Loss},
author = {Fei Zheng and Chaochao Chen and Lingjuan Lyu and Xinyi Fu and Xing Fu and Weiqiang Wang and Xiaolin Zheng and Jianwei Yin},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.09617},
year = {2024}
}