Mixed population Minority Game with generalized strategies
Condensed Matter
2009-10-31 v1 Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems
Abstract
We present a quantitative theory, based on crowd effects, for the market volatility in a Minority Game played by a mixed population. Below a critical concentration of generalized strategy players, we find that the volatility in the crowded regime remains above the random coin-toss value regardless of the "temperature" controlling strategy use. Our theory yields good agreement with numerical simulations.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.cond-mat/0005043,
title = {Mixed population Minority Game with generalized strategies},
author = {P. Jefferies and M. Hart and N. F. Johnson and P. M. Hui},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:cond-mat/0005043},
year = {2009}
}
Comments
Revtex file + 3 figures