Mean-Field Games for Marriage
Optimization and Control
2015-06-19 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory
Systems and Control
Dynamical Systems
Probability
Abstract
This article examines mean-field games for marriage. The results support the argument that optimizing the long-term well-being through effort and social feeling state distribution (mean-field) will help to stabilize marriage. However, if the cost of effort is very high, the couple fluctuates in a bad feeling state or the marriage breaks down. We then examine the influence of society on a couple using mean field sentimental games. We show that, in mean-field equilibrium, the optimal effort is always higher than the one-shot optimal effort. We illustrate numerically the influence of the couple's network on their feeling states and their well-being.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1404.3389,
title = {Mean-Field Games for Marriage},
author = {Dario Bauso and Ben Mansour Dia and Boualem Djehiche and Hamidou Tembine and Raul Tempone},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1404.3389},
year = {2015}
}
Comments
22 figures. Accepted and to appear in PLoS One