English

Learning Nash Equilibrium for General-Sum Markov Games from Batch Data

Computer Science and Game Theory 2017-03-07 v4

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium in γ\gamma-discounted multiplayer general-sum Markov Games (MG). A key component of this model is the possibility for the players to either collaborate or team apart to increase their rewards. Building an artificial player for general-sum MGs implies to learn more complex strategies which are impossible to obtain by using techniques developed for two-player zero-sum MGs. In this paper, we introduce a new definition of ϵ\epsilon-Nash equilibrium in MGs which grasps the strategy's quality for multiplayer games. We prove that minimizing the norm of two Bellman-like residuals implies the convergence to such an ϵ\epsilon-Nash equilibrium. Then, we show that minimizing an empirical estimate of the LpL_p norm of these Bellman-like residuals allows learning for general-sum games within the batch setting. Finally, we introduce a neural network architecture named NashNetwork that successfully learns a Nash equilibrium in a generic multiplayer general-sum turn-based MG.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1606.08718,
  title  = {Learning Nash Equilibrium for General-Sum Markov Games from Batch Data},
  author = {Julien Pérolat and Florian Strub and Bilal Piot and Olivier Pietquin},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.08718},
  year   = {2017}
}

Comments

20th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics (AISTATS) 2017, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, USA. JMLR: W&CP volume 54

R2 v1 2026-06-22T14:36:51.673Z