How Conflict Aversion Can Enable Authoritarianism: An Evolutionary Dynamics Approach
Abstract
We use evolutionary game theory to examine how conflict-averse centrism can facilitate authoritarian success in polarized political conflicts. Such conflicts are often asymmetric: authoritarian actors can employ norm-breaking or coercive tactics, while democratic resistance faces stronger normative constraints on acceptable behavior. Yet formal models typically treat sides symmetrically and rarely examine conflict-averse behavior. Drawing on empirical research on protest backlash, civility norms, and authoritarian resilience, we model these dynamics as a three-strategy evolutionary game. This framework yields two outcomes -- cyclic authoritarian resurgence through a heteroclinic cycle and a stable centrist--authoritarian coalition excluding resistance -- depending on confrontation responses. We demonstrate how an established dynamical framework with empirically grounded behavioral assumptions clarifies conditions under which conflict aversion can diminish the effectiveness of democratic resistance.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2512.06245,
title = {How Conflict Aversion Can Enable Authoritarianism: An Evolutionary Dynamics Approach},
author = {Chad M. Topaz},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2512.06245},
year = {2025}
}