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Evolutionary game theory has been successfully used to investigate the dynamics of systems, in which many entities have competitive interactions. From a physics point of view, it is interesting to study conditions under which a coordination…

The force of the ethnic separatism, essentially origining from negative effect of ethnic identity, is damaging the stability and harmony of multiethnic countries. In order to eliminate the foundation of the ethnic separatism and set up a…

An important way to resolve games of conflict (snowdrift, hawk-dove, chicken) involves adopting a convention: a correlated equilibrium that avoids any conflict between aggressive strategies. Dynamic networks allow individuals to resolve…

We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model where agents who make decisions using either automatic or…

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with…

There is a broad recognition that commitment-based mechanisms can promote coordination and cooperative behaviours in both biological populations and self-organised multi-agent systems by making individuals' intentions explicit prior to…

Polarization issue is generally subject to ideological polarization and affective polarization. In particular, affective polarization usually accelerates the polarization process and transform social interactions into a zero-sum game. Yet,…

Human societies around the world interact with each other by developing and maintaining social norms, and it is critically important to understand how such norms emerge and change. In this work, we define an evolutionary game-theoretic…

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are…

Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…

Conflict destabilizes social interactions and impedes cooperation at multiple scales of biological organization. Of fundamental interest are the causes of turbulent periods of conflict. We analyze conflict dynamics in a monkey society model…

The biased interaction game described the operation of systems rooted in boundedly rational interactions under conditions of scarcity. The game explored the influence of bias and demonstrated how hierarchy and inequality are emergent system…

Decades of scientific inquiry have sought to understand how evolution fosters cooperation, a concept seemingly at odds with the belief that evolution should produce rational, self-interested individuals. Most previous work has focused on…

In recent years, there has been growing interest in studying evolutionary games with environmental feedback. Previous studies exclusively focus on two-player games. However, extension to multi-player game is needed to study problems such as…

Recently, the eco-evolutionary game theory which describes the coupled dynamics of strategies and environment have attracted great attention. At the same time, most of the current work is focused on the classic two-player two-strategy game.…

Competing strategies in an evolutionary game model, or species in a biosystem, can easily form a larger unit which protects them from the invasion of an external actor. Such a defensive alliance may have two, three, four or even more…

Social hierarchy in animal groups carries a crucial adaptive function by reducing conflict and injury while protecting valuable group resources. Social hierarchy is dynamic and can be altered by social conflict, agonistic interactions, and…

We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator…

We use analytical techniques based on an expansion in the inverse system size to study the stochastic evolutionary dynamics of finite populations of players interacting in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We show that a mechanism of…

In this paper we extend the framework of evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions dealing with the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the…