English

Global Policy-Space Response Oracles for Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

Artificial Intelligence 2026-05-28 v1

Abstract

The Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) framework scales equilibrium computation to large zero-sum games by iteratively expanding a restricted strategy set using deep reinforcement learning (DRL). A central challenge is to construct, under limited computational budgets, a small strategy population whose induced game well approximates the full game. Existing PSRO variants typically expand the population using best responses to meta-strategies computed from restricted-game payoffs, which can lead to inefficient expansions that provide limited global improvement. We propose to guide population expansion by directly evaluating the post-expansion population quality. Specifically, we adopt Population Exploitability (PE) to measure how well a restricted strategy set represents the full game, and introduce a two-phase exploration--selection framework that explicitly minimizes PE during expansion. We instantiate this framework as Global PSRO, a practical DRL-based algorithm that efficiently generates candidate responses and estimates PE via parameter-sharing conditional neural networks. Experiments across multiple two-player zero-sum games show that Global PSRO achieves lower exploitability and approximates Nash equilibria with significantly fewer policy iterations than prior PSRO methods.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2605.28273,
  title  = {Global Policy-Space Response Oracles for Two-Player Zero-Sum Games},
  author = {Junyu Zhang and Feihong Yang and Jian Wang and Chao Wang and Xudong Zhang},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2605.28273},
  year   = {2026}
}

Comments

Accepted by ICML 2026