Fast Algorithms for Rank-1 Bimatrix Games
Abstract
The rank of a bimatrix game is the matrix rank of the sum of the two payoff matrices. This paper comprehensively analyzes games of rank one, and shows the following: (1) For a game of rank r, the set of its Nash equilibria is the intersection of a generically one-dimensional set of equilibria of parameterized games of rank r-1 with a hyperplane. (2) One equilibrium of a rank-1 game can be found in polynomial time. (3) All equilibria of a rank-1 game can be found by following a piecewise linear path. In contrast, such a path-following method finds only one equilibrium of a bimatrix game. (4) The number of equilibria of a rank-1 game may be exponential. (5) There is a homeomorphism between the space of bimatrix games and their equilibrium correspondence that preserves rank. It is a variation of the homeomorphism used for the concept of strategic stability of an equilibrium component.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1812.04611,
title = {Fast Algorithms for Rank-1 Bimatrix Games},
author = {Bharat Adsul and Jugal Garg and Ruta Mehta and Milind Sohoni and Bernhard von Stengel},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.04611},
year = {2023}
}
Comments
New in v4: detailed comparison with Theobald (2009) on page 6. Footnotes removed. Final version accepted by OPERATIONS RESEARCH