Distributional Alignment Games for Answer-Level Fine-Tuning

We focus on the problem of \emph{Answer-Level Fine-Tuning} (ALFT), where the goal is to optimize a language model based on the correctness or properties of its final answers, rather than the specific reasoning traces used to produce them. Directly optimizing answer-level objectives is computationally intractable due to the need to marginalize over the vast space of latent reasoning paths. To overcome this, we propose a general game-theoretical framework that lifts the problem to a \emph{Distributional Alignment Game}. We formulate ALFT as a two-player game between a Policy (the generator) and a Target (an auxiliary distribution). We prove that the Nash Equilibrium of this game corresponds exactly to the solution of the original answer-level optimization problem. This variational perspective transforms the intractable marginalization problem into a tractable projection problem. We demonstrate that this framework unifies recent approaches to diversity and self-improvement (coherence) and provide efficient algorithms compatible with Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), such as Coherence-GRPO, yielding significant complexity gains in mathematical reasoning tasks.