As the use of algorithmic systems in high-stakes decision-making increases, the ability to contest algorithmic decisions is being recognised as an important safeguard for individuals. Yet, there is little guidance on what `contestability'--the ability to contest decisions--in relation to algorithmic decision-making requires. Recent research presents different conceptualisations of contestability in algorithmic decision-making. We contribute to this growing body of work by describing and analysing the perspectives of people and organisations who made submissions in response to Australia's proposed `AI Ethics Framework', the first framework of its kind to include `contestability' as a core ethical principle. Our findings reveal that while the nature of contestability is disputed, it is seen as a way to protect individuals, and it resembles contestability in relation to human decision-making. We reflect on and discuss the implications of these findings.
@article{arxiv.2103.01774,
title = {Conceptualising Contestability: Perspectives on Contesting Algorithmic Decisions},
author = {Henrietta Lyons and Eduardo Velloso and Tim Miller},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2103.01774},
year = {2021}
}