English

Verifiable Off-Chain Governance

Computer Science and Game Theory 2025-12-30 v1 Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science

Abstract

Current DAO governance praxis limits organizational expressivity and reduces complex organizational decisions to token-weighted voting due to on-chain computational limits. This paper proposes verifiable off-chain computation (leveraging Verifiable Services, TEEs, and ZK proofs) as a framework to transcend these constraints while maintaining cryptoeconomic security. This paper explores three novel governance mechanisms: (1) attestation-based systems that compute multi-dimensional stakeholder legitimacy, (2) collective intelligence through verifiable preference processing, and (3) autonomous policy execution via Policy-as-Code. The framework provides architectural specifications, security models, and implementation considerations for DAOs seeking higher-resolution expressivity and increased operational efficiency, with validation from pioneering implementations demonstrating practical viability.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2512.23618,
  title  = {Verifiable Off-Chain Governance},
  author = {Jake Hartnell and Eugenio Battaglia},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2512.23618},
  year   = {2025}
}
R2 v1 2026-07-01T08:44:37.304Z