English

Prioritizing Consumers in Smart Grid: A Game Theoretic Approach

Systems and Control 2016-11-17 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory

Abstract

This paper proposes an energy management technique for a consumer-to-grid system in smart grid. The benefit to consumers is made the primary concern to encourage consumers to participate voluntarily in energy trading with the central power station (CPS) in situations of energy deficiency. A novel system model motivating energy trading under the goal of social optimality is proposed. A single-leader multiple-follower Stackelberg game is then studied to model the interactions between the CPS and a number of energy consumers (ECs), and to find optimal distributed solutions for the optimization problem based on the system model. The CPS is considered as a leader seeking to minimize its total cost of buying energy from the ECs, and the ECs are the followers who decide on how much energy they will sell to the CPS for maximizing their utilities. It is shown that the game, which can be implemented distributedly, possesses a socially optimal solution, in which the benefits-sum to all consumers is maximized, as the total cost to the CPS is minimized. Numerical analysis confirms the effectiveness of the game.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1312.0659,
  title  = {Prioritizing Consumers in Smart Grid: A Game Theoretic Approach},
  author = {Wayes Tushar and Jian A. Zhang and David Smith and H. Vincent Poor and Sylvie Thiebaux},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.0659},
  year   = {2016}
}

Comments

10 pages, 8 figures. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2013

R2 v1 2026-06-22T02:19:24.090Z