English

New Results for the $k$-Secretary Problem

Data Structures and Algorithms 2020-12-02 v1

Abstract

Suppose that nn items arrive online in random order and the goal is to select kk of them such that the expected sum of the selected items is maximized. The decision for any item is irrevocable and must be made on arrival without knowing future items. This problem is known as the kk-secretary problem, which includes the classical secretary problem with the special case k=1k=1. It is well-known that the latter problem can be solved by a simple algorithm of competitive ratio 1/e1/e which is optimal for nn \to \infty. Existing algorithms beating the threshold of 1/e1/e either rely on involved selection policies already for k=2k=2, or assume that kk is large. In this paper we present results for the kk-secretary problem, considering the interesting and relevant case that kk is small. We focus on simple selection algorithms, accompanied by combinatorial analyses. As a main contribution we propose a natural deterministic algorithm designed to have competitive ratios strictly greater than 1/e1/e for small k2k \geq 2. This algorithm is hardly more complex than the elegant strategy for the classical secretary problem, optimal for k=1k=1, and works for all k1k \geq 1. We derive its competitive ratios for k100k \leq 100, ranging from 0.410.41 for k=2k=2 to 0.750.75 for k=100k=100. Moreover, we consider an algorithm proposed earlier in the literature, for which no rigorous analysis is known. We show that its competitive ratio is 0.41680.4168 for k=2k=2, implying that the previous analysis was not tight. Our analysis reveals a surprising combinatorial property of this algorithm, which might be helpful to find a tight analysis for all kk.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2012.00488,
  title  = {New Results for the $k$-Secretary Problem},
  author = {Susanne Albers and Leon Ladewig},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2012.00488},
  year   = {2020}
}

Comments

Full and revised version of ISAAC 2019 paper

R2 v1 2026-06-23T20:38:21.278Z