The Controller Area Network (CAN) is considered as the de-facto standard for the in-vehicle communications due to its real-time performance and high reliability. Unfortunately, the lack of security protection on the CAN bus gives attackers the opportunity to remotely compromise a vehicle. In this paper, we propose a Lightweight Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP) with low cost and high efficiency to address the security issue of the CAN bus. LEAP exploits the security-enhanced stream cipher primitive to provide encryption and authentication for the CAN messages. Compared with the state-of-the-art Message Authentication Code (MAC) based approaches, LEAP requires less memory, is 8X faster, and thwarts the most recently proposed attacks.
@article{arxiv.1909.10380,
title = {LEAP: A Lightweight Encryption and Authentication Protocol for In-Vehicle Communications},
author = {Zhaojun Lu and Qian Wang and Xi Chen and Gang Qu and Yongqiang Lyu and Zhenglin Liu},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.10380},
year = {2019}
}