Density and Affinity Dependent Social Segregation and Arbitrage Equilibrium in a Multi-class Schelling Game
Abstract
Contrary to the widely believed hypothesis that larger, denser cities promote socioeconomic mixing, a recent study (Nilforoshan et al. 2023) reports the opposite behavior, i.e. more segregation. Here, we present a game-theoretic model that predicts such a density-dependent segregation outcome in both one- and two-class systems. The model provides key insights into the analytical conditions that lead to such behavior. Furthermore, the arbitrage equilibrium outcome implies the equality of effective utilities among all agents. This could be interpreted as all agents being equally "happy" in their respective environments in our ideal society. We believe that our model contributes towards a deeper mathematical understanding of social dynamics and behavior, which is important as we strive to develop more harmonious societies.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2403.04084,
title = {Density and Affinity Dependent Social Segregation and Arbitrage Equilibrium in a Multi-class Schelling Game},
author = {Venkat Venkatasubramanian and Jessica Shi and Leo Goldman and Arun Sankar E. M. and Abhishek Sivaram},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.04084},
year = {2024}
}
Comments
arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2312.05765