Related papers: Improving the security of quantum exam against che…
In this comment we point out that the 'quantum dialogue' (Phys. Lett. A (in press); quant-ph/0406130) can be eavesdropped under the intercept-and-resend attack. We also give a revised control mode to detect this attack.
We find that the generally accepted security criteria are flawed for a whole class of protocols for quantum cryptography. This is so because a standard assumption of the security analysis, namely that the so-called square-root measurement…
Recently, a broadcasting multiple blind signature scheme based on quantum teleportation has been proposed for the first time. It is claimed to have unconditional security and properties of quantum multiple signature and quantum blind…
This study explores a new security problem existing in various state-of-the-art quantum private comparison (QPC) protocols, where a malicious third-party (TP) announces fake comparison (or intermediate) results. In this case, the…
Recent advances indicate that quantum computers will soon be reality. Motivated by this ever more realistic threat for existing classical cryptographic protocols, researchers have developed several schemes to resist "quantum attacks". In…
As quantum key distribution becomes a mature technology, it appears clearly that some assumptions made in the security proofs cannot be justified in practical implementations. This might open the door to possible side-channel attacks. We…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum message encryption protocols promise a secure way to distribute information while detecting eavesdropping. However, current protocols may suffer from significantly reduced eavesdropping protection…
A secure quantum identification system combining a classical identification procedure and quantum key distribution is proposed. Each identification sequence is always used just once and new sequences are ``refuelled'' from a shared provably…
The security of a cryptographic key that is generated by communication through a noisy quantum channel relies on the ability to distill a shorter secure key sequence from a longer insecure one. We show that -- for protocols that use quantum…
Quantum Key Distribution with the BB84 protocol has been shown to be unconditionally secure even using weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon signals. The distances that can be covered by these methods are limited due to the loss in…
The general individual (non-coherent) attack on the ping-pong protocol with completely entangled pairs of three-dimensional quantum systems (qutrits) is analyzed. The expression for amount of the eavesdropper's information as functions from…
Many papers proved the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) system, in the asymptotic framework. The degree of the security has not been discussed in the finite coding-length framework, sufficiently. However, to guarantee any…
By sending systems in specially prepared quantum states, two parties can communicate without an eavesdropper being able to listen. The technique, called quantum cryptography, enables one to verify that the state of the quantum system has…
Security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) typically assume that the devices of the legitimate users are perfectly shielded from the eavesdropper. This assumption is, however, very hard to meet in practice, and thus the security of…
We propose a quantum key distribution scheme by using screening angles and analyzing detectors which enable to notice the presence of Eve who eavesdrops the quantum channel, as the revised protocol of the recent quantum key distribution…
We show that computational problem of testing the behaviour of quantum circuits is hard for the class of problems known as QMA that can be verified efficiently with a quantum computer. This result is a generalization of the techniques…
The laws of physics play a crucial role in the security of quantum key distribution (QKD). This fact has often been misunderstood as if the security of QKD would be based only on the laws of physics. As the experts know well, things are…
Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) assume that there is no unwanted information leakage about the state preparation process. However, this assumption is impossible to guarantee in practice, as QKD systems can leak…
We present a complete protocol for BB84 quantum key distribution for a realistic setting (noise, loss, multi-photon signals of the source) that covers many of todays experimental implementations. The security of this protocol is shown…
Though the BB84 protocol has provable security over a noiseless quantum channel, the security is not proven over current noisy technology. The level of tolerable error on such systems is still unclear, as is how much information about a raw…