Related papers: On the security of AlphaEta: Response to `Some att…
A practical quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol necessarily runs in finite time and, hence, only a finite amount of communication is exchanged. This is in contrast to most of the standard results on the security of QKD, which only hold…
The safety of a quantum key distribution system relies on the fact that any eavesdropping attempt on the quantum channel creates errors in the transmission. For a given error rate, the amount of information that may have leaked to the…
Quantum Key Distribution with the BB84 protocol has been shown to be unconditionally secure even using weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon signals. The distances that can be covered by these methods are limited due to the loss in…
We propose a framework of bit commitment protocol using a comparison scheme and present a compound comparison scheme based on counterfactual cryptography. Finally, we propose a counterfactual quantum bit commitment protocol. In security…
We propose an information-theoretically secure encryption scheme for classical messages with quantum ciphertexts that offers detection of eavesdropping attacks, and re-usability of the key in case no eavesdropping took place: the entire key…
In recent years, several hacking attacks have broken the security of quantum cryptography implementations by exploiting the presence of losses and the ability of the eavesdropper to tune detection efficiencies. We present a simple attack of…
We present a protocol for quantum cryptography in which the data obtained for mismatched bases are used in full for the purpose of quantum state tomography. Eavesdropping on the quantum channel is seriously impeded by requiring that the…
Imperfect bit-and-basis encoders compromise the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems via modulation flaws, side channels and inter-pulse correlations, which invalidate standard security proofs. Existing results addressing such…
Despite enormous progress both in theoretical and experimental quantum cryptography, the security of most current implementations of quantum key distribution is still not established rigorously. One of the main problems is that the security…
All the currently available unconditional security proofs on quantum key distribution, in particular for the BB84 protocol and its variants including continuous-variable ones, are invalid or incomplete at many points. In this paper we…
Large-scale quantum computing is a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography. In strong "quantum access" security models, numerous symmetric-key cryptosystems are also vulnerable. We consider classical encryption in a model…
Quantum algorithms can break factoring and discrete logarithm based cryptography and weaken symmetric cryptography and hash functions. In order to estimate the real-world impact of these attacks, apart from tracking the development of…
Quantum cryptography exploits principles of quantum physics for the secure processing of information. A prominent example is secure communication, i.e., the task of transmitting confidential messages from one location to another. The…
In this Paper, we investigate the security of Zhang, Li and Guo quantum key distribution via quantum encryption protocol [$\text{Phys. Rev. A} \textbf{64}, 24302 (2001)$] and show that it is not secure against some of Eve's attacks and with…
Entanglement-measurement attack is one of the most famous attacks against quantum cryptography. In quantum cryptography protocols, eavesdropping checking is an effective means to resist this attack. There are currently two commonly used…
All existing quantum cryptosystems use non-orthogonal states as the carriers of information. Non-orthogonal states cannot be cloned (duplicated) by an eavesdropper. In result, any eavesdropping attempt must introduce errors in the…
An author (arXiv:1709.09262 [quant-ph] (2017), Nanoscale Research Letters (2017) 12:552) has recently questioned the security of two-way quantum key distribution schemes by referring to attack strategies which leave no errors in the (raw)…
There had been well known claims of unconditionally secure quantum protocols for bit commitment. However, we, and independently Mayers, showed that all proposed quantum bit commitment schemes are, in principle, insecure because the sender,…
How could quantum cryptography help us achieve what are not achievable in classical cryptography? In this work we study the classical cryptographic problem that two parties would like to perform secure computations with long outputs. As a…
The fundamental security and efficiency considerations for fresh key generation will be described. It is shown that the attacker's optimal probability of finding the generated key is an indispensable measure of security and that this…