Related papers: Equilibria of Replicator Dynamics in Quantum Games
We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information. Our main algorithm is for two-player games, and we describe how it can be extended to…
In this paper we study the computational complexity of computing an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in multi-player symmetric games. For two-player games, deciding existence of an ESS is complete for {\Sigma} 2 , the second level of the…
We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader…
Using the Logit quantal response form as the response function in each step, the original definition of static quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is extended into an iterative evolution process. QREs remain as the fixed points of the…
In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…
In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…
The multi-population replicator dynamics (RD) can be considered a dynamic approach to the study of multi-player games, where it was shown to be related to Cross' learning, as well as of systems of coevolving populations. However, not all of…
We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two…
Evolutionary game theory combines game theory and dynamical systems and is customarily adopted to describe evolutionary dynamics in multi-agent systems. In particular, it has been proven to be a successful tool to describe multi-agent…
Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…
Human language is still an embarrassment for evolutionary theory, as the speaker's benefit remains unclear. The willingness to communicate information is shown here to be an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), even if acquiring original…
We present the first study of a dynamical quantum game. Each agent has a `memory' of her performance over the previous m timesteps, and her strategy can evolve in time. The game exhibits distinct regimes of optimality. For small m the…
Evolutionary game theory is a framework to formalize the evolution of collectives ("populations") of competing agents that are playing a game and, after every round, update their strategies to maximize individual payoffs. There are two…
We provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and investigate evolutionary and asymptotic stability (in the replicator dynamics) of their Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between…
We construct two models of discrete-time replicator dynamics with time delay. In the social-type model, players imitate opponents taking into account average payoffs of games played some units of time ago. In the biological-type model, new…
We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…
Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the…
What does it mean to fully understand the behavior of a network of adaptive agents? The golden standard typically is the behavior of learning dynamics in potential games, where many evolutionary dynamics, e.g., replicator, are known to…