Related papers: Stochastic stability in three-player games
Across many domains of interaction, both natural and artificial, individuals use past experience to shape future behaviors. The results of such learning processes depend on what individuals wish to maximize. A natural objective is one's own…
Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing evolutionary biology, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary biologists in particular the question is often how such behaviors can arise \textit{de novo}…
We propose an evolutionary coordination game to formalize a simplified model of the evolution of strategies during human courtship. The dynamics, derived from the consideration of experimental observations on human social behavior driven by…
Over the past few decades, many works have studied the evolutionary dynamics of continuous games. However, previous works have primarily focused on two-player games with pairwise interactions. Indeed, group interactions rather than pairwise…
The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…
In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We…
To investigate the origin of cooperative behaviors, we developed an evolutionary model of sequential strategies and tested our model with computer simulations. The sequential strategies represented by stochastic machines were evaluated…
We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information. Our main algorithm is for two-player games, and we describe how it can be extended to…
We study adaptive learning in a typical p-player game. The payoffs of the games are randomly generated and then held fixed. The strategies of the players evolve through time as the players learn. The trajectories in the strategy space…
Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical toolkit to analyse the interactions that an individual agent has in a population and how the composition of strategies in this population evolves over time. While it can provide neat solutions to…
Spatial evolutionary games model individuals who are distributed in a spatial domain and update their strategies upon playing a normal form game with their neighbors. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic approximations…
We model evolution according to an asymmetric game as occurring in multiple finite populations, one for each role in the game, and study the effect of subjecting individuals to stochastic strategy mutations. We show that, when these…
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. The existing literature shows that under…
Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two…
People tend to align their use of language to the linguistic behaviour of their own ingroup and to simultaneously diverge from the language use of outgroups. This paper proposes to model this phenomenon of sociolinguistic identity…
Evolutionary games are a developing sub-field of game theory. This branch of game theory is used in the study of the adaptation of large, but finite, populations of agents to changes in the environment. It assumes that each agent has no…
In this review, we summarize recent developments in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics of finite populations.
This paper unifies the concepts of evolutionary games and quantum strategies. First, we state the formulation and properties of classical evolutionary strategies, with focus on the destinations of evolution in 2-player 2-strategy games. We…
Game theory ideas provide a useful framework for studying evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed environment. This approach, however, typically enforces a strictly fixed overall population size, deemphasizing natural growth processes. We…
In this paper we study collective decision making on a multi-population, represented by a regular network of groups of individuals. Each group consists of a collection of players and every player can choose between two options. A group is…