Related papers: Emergence of cooperation induced by preferential l…
Understanding the evolution of cooperation in multiplayer games is of vital significance for natural and social systems. An important challenge is that group interactions often leads to nonlinear synergistic effects. However, previous…
This paper explores the use of Generative Pre-trained Transformers (GPT) in strategic game experiments, specifically the ultimatum game and the prisoner's dilemma. I designed prompts and architectures to enable GPT to understand the game…
Recent paradigm shifts from imitation learning to reinforcement learning (RL) is shown to be productive in understanding human behaviors. In the RL paradigm, individuals search for optimal strategies through interaction with the environment…
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation…
Most of previous studies concerning the Public Goods Game assume either participation is unconditional or the number of actual participants in a competitive group changes over time. How the fixed group size, prescribed by social…
In this paper, the Optional Prisoner's Dilemma game in a spatial environment, with coevolutionary rules for both the strategy and network links between agents, is studied. Using a Monte Carlo simulation approach, a number of experiments are…
Most papers about the evolutionary game on graph assume the statistic network structure. However, social interaction could change the relationship of people. And the changing social structure will affect the people's strategy too. We build…
Heterogeneity has been studied as one of the most common explanations of the puzzle of cooperation in social dilemmas. A large number of papers have been published discussing the effects of increasing heterogeneity in structured populations…
Ecology and evolution are inherently linked, and studying a mathematical model that considers both holds promise of insightful discoveries related to the dynamics of cooperation. In the present article, we use the prisoner's dilemma (PD)…
In evolutionary game theory, repeated two-player games are used to study strategy evolution in a population under natural selection. As the evolution greatly depends on the interaction structure, there has been growing interests in studying…
Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known…
We study in detail the role of short-cuts in promoting the emergence of cooperation in a network of agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). We introduce a model whose topology interpolates between the one-dimensional euclidean…
A network model based on players' aspirations is proposed and analyzed theoretically and numerically within the framework of evolutionary game theory. In this model, players decide whether to cooperate or defect by comparing their payoffs…
This study investigates the influence of lattice structure in evolutionary games. The snowdrift games is considered in networks with high clustering coefficients, that use four different strategy-updating. Analytical conjectures using pair…
How cooperation emerges is a long-standing and interdisciplinary problem. Game-theoretical studies on social dilemmas reveal that altruistic incentives are critical to the emergence of cooperation but their analyses are limited to stateless…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…
We introduce the concept of a multi-principal assistance game (MPAG), and circumvent an obstacle in social choice theory, Gibbard's theorem, by using a sufficiently collegial preference inference mechanism. In an MPAG, a single agent…
The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a…
In this work we have used computer models of social-like networks to show by extensive numerical simulations that cooperation in evolutionary games can emerge and be stable on this class of networks. The amounts of cooperation reached are…
We study a condition of favoring cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks. There are two kinds of players: cooperators and defectors. Cooperators pay a benefit b to their neighbors at a cost c, whereas defectors only…