The Optional Prisoner's Dilemma in a Spatial Environment: Coevolving Game Strategy and Link Weights
Neural and Evolutionary Computing
2017-12-04 v1 Multiagent Systems
Dynamical Systems
Abstract
In this paper, the Optional Prisoner's Dilemma game in a spatial environment, with coevolutionary rules for both the strategy and network links between agents, is studied. Using a Monte Carlo simulation approach, a number of experiments are performed to identify favourable configurations of the environment for the emergence of cooperation in adverse scenarios. Results show that abstainers play a key role in the protection of cooperators against exploitation from defectors. Scenarios of cyclic competition and of full dominance of cooperation are also observed. This work provides insights towards gaining an in-depth understanding of the emergence of cooperative behaviour in real-world systems.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1609.06560,
title = {The Optional Prisoner's Dilemma in a Spatial Environment: Coevolving Game Strategy and Link Weights},
author = {Marcos Cardinot and Colm O'Riordan and Josephine Griffith},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.06560},
year = {2017}
}
Comments
To be presented at ECTA 2016, Porto, Portugal