Related papers: Design in Complex Systems: Individual Performance …
Inspired by successful biological collective decision mechanisms such as honey bees searching for a new colony or the collective navigation of fish schools, we consider a mean field games (MFG)-like scenario where a large number of agents…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
Theory and empirical research on management teams' influence on firm performance have witnessed continuous development, and by now incorporate numerous details. Classic, experiment-based studies examining social systems collect vast amount…
Resource allocation takes place in various kinds of real-world complex systems, such as the traffic systems, social services institutions or organizations, or even the ecosystems. The fundamental principle underlying complex…
We study the notion of efficiency for cooperative games on simplicial complexes. In such games, the grand coalition $[n]$ may be forbidden, and, thus, it is a non-trivial problem to study the total number of payoff $v_{\Delta}$ of a…
We explore the effect of discounting and experimentation in a simple model of interacting adaptive agents. Agents belong to either of two types and each has to decide whether to participate a game or not, the game being profitable when…
We investigate the dynamics of the choice of an active strategy in the minority game. A history distribution is introduced as an analytical tool to study the asymmetry between the two choices offered to the agents. Its properties are…
We present a formal treatment of the Crowd-Anticrowd theory of Minority Games played by a population of competing agents. This theory is built around a description of the crowding which arises within the game's strategy space. Earlier works…
We consider multi-agent systems where agents' preferences are aggregated via sequential majority voting: each decision is taken by performing a sequence of pairwise comparisons where each comparison is a weighted majority vote among the…
We analyze a simple model of adaptive competition which captures essential features of a variety of adaptive competitive systems in the social and biological sciences. Each of N agents, at each time step of a game, joins one of two groups.…
We study analytically and by computer simulations a complex system of adaptive agents with finite memory. Borrowing the framework of the Minority Game and using the replica formalism we show the existence of an equilibrium phase transition…
It is known that the memory is relevant in the symmetric phase of the minority game. In our previous work we have successfully explained the quasi-periodic behavior of the game in the symmetric phase with the help of the probability theory.…
Inspired by the cognitive science theory, we explicitly model an agent with both semantic and episodic memory systems, and show that it is better than having just one of the two memory systems. In order to show this, we have designed and…
A collective of identical agents in a multi-agent system often works together towards the common goal. In situations where no supervisor agents are present to make decisions for the group, these agents must achieve some consensus via…
We show analytically how the fluctuations (i.e. standard deviation) in the Minority Game (MG) can be made to decrease below the random coin-toss limit if the agents use more general behavioral strategies. This suppression of the standard…
With the development of artificial intelligence, human beings are increasingly interested in human-agent collaboration, which generates a series of problems about the relationship between agents and humans, such as trust and cooperation.…
Organisations rely upon group formation to solve complex tasks, and groups often adapt to the demands of the task they face by changing their composition periodically. Previous research comes to ambiguous results regarding the effects of…
We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad…
We study the interpersonal trust of a population of agents, asking whether chance may decide if a population ends up in a high trust or low trust state. We model this by a discrete time, random matching stochastic coordination game. Agents…
A population of heterogenous agents compeeting through a minority rule is investigated. Agents which frequently loose are selected for evolution by changing their strategies. The stationary composition of the population resulting for this…