Dynamical instabilities in a simple minority game with discounting
Physics and Society
2009-11-13 v1
Abstract
We explore the effect of discounting and experimentation in a simple model of interacting adaptive agents. Agents belong to either of two types and each has to decide whether to participate a game or not, the game being profitable when there is an excess of players of the other type. We find the emergence of large fluctuations as a result of the onset of a dynamical instability which may arise discontinuously (increasing the discount factor) or continuously (decreasing the experimentation rate). The phase diagram is characterized in detail and noise amplification close to a bifurcation point is identified as the physical mechanism behind the instability.
Cite
@article{arxiv.0802.1054,
title = {Dynamical instabilities in a simple minority game with discounting},
author = {Damien Challet and Andrea De Martino and Matteo Marsili},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:0802.1054},
year = {2009}
}
Comments
8 pages