Related papers: Late comment on Astumian's paradox
This paper considers a class of reinforcement-learning that belongs to the family of Learning Automata and provides a stochastic-stability analysis in strategic-form games. For this class of dynamics, convergence to pure Nash equilibria has…
The theory of mean field games is a tool to understand noncooperative dynamic stochastic games with a large number of players. Much of the theory has evolved under conditions ensuring uniqueness of the mean field game Nash equilibrium.…
We prove that zero-sum Dynkin games in continuous time with partial and asymmetric information admit a value in randomised stopping times when the stopping payoffs of the players are general \cadlag measurable processes. As a by-product of…
Parrondo's games manifest the apparent paradox where losing strategies can be combined to win and have generated significant multidisciplinary interest in the literature. Here we review two recent approaches, based on the Fokker-Planck…
We develop a probabilistic approach to continuous-time finite state mean field games. Based on an alternative description of continuous-time Markov chain by means of semimartingale and the weak formulation of stochastic optimal control, our…
Markov Chains offer ideal conditions for the study and mathematical modelling of a certain kind of situations depending on random variables. The basic concepts of the corresponding theory were introduced by Markov in 1907 on coding literary…
Admissible strategies, i.e. those that are not dominated by any other strategy, are a typical rationality notion in game theory. In many classes of games this is justified by results showing that any strategy is admissible or dominated by…
Paradox of choice occurs when permitting new strategies to some players yields lower payoffs for all players in the new equilibrium via a sequence of individually rational actions. We consider social network games. In these games the payoff…
Zero-sum stochastic games generalize the notion of Markov Decision Processes (i.e. controlled Markov chains, or stochastic dynamic programming) to the 2-player competitive case : two players jointly control the evolution of a state…
Mertens [In Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians (Berkeley, Calif., 1986) (1987) 1528-1577 Amer. Math. Soc.] proposed two general conjectures about repeated games: the first one is that, in any two-person zero-sum…
We consider a class of two-player dynamic stochastic nonzero-sum games where the state transition and observation equations are linear, and the primitive random variables are Gaussian. Each controller acquires possibly different dynamic…
We discuss a couple of examples of Markov chains. This note is written primarily for school students; it is based on a lecture given by the first author at a Math Circle at NAS (www.assagames.com/nas).
We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with players. One oracle dominates another if, in every game, it can match the set of equilibrium outcomes induced by the latter. Distinct characterizations…
Combinatorial games are played under two different play conventions: normal play, where the last player to move wins, and \mis play, where the last player to move loses. Combinatorial games are also classified into impartial positions and…
This paper considers a class of reinforcement-based learning (namely, perturbed learning automata) and provides a stochastic-stability analysis in repeatedly-played, positive-utility, finite strategic-form games. Prior work in this class of…
Cooperative Parrondo's games on a regular two dimensional lattice are analyzed based on the computer simulations and on the discrete-time Markov chain model with exact transition probabilities. The paradox appears in the vicinity of the…
This paper investigates properties of Blackwell $\epsilon$-optimal strategies in zero-sum stochastic games when the adversary is restricted to stationary strategies, motivated by applications to robust Markov decision processes. For a class…
We consider graphical $n$-person games with perfect information that have no Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies. Solving these games in mixed strategies, we introduce probabilistic distributions in all non-terminal positions. The…
In this paper we continue the study of conditional Markov chains (CMCs) with finite state spaces, that we initiated in Bielecki, Jakubowski and Niew\k{e}g{\l}owski (2014a) in an effort to enrich the theory of CMCs that was originated in…
For a stochastically monotone Markov chain taking values in a Polish space, we present a number of conditions for existence and for uniqueness of its stationary regime, as well as for closeness of its transient trajectories. In particular,…