Related papers: A Predictive Theory of Games
Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…
We consider a game-theoretic setting to model the interplay between attacker and defender in the context of information flow, and to reason about their optimal strategies. In contrast with standard game theory, in our games the utility of a…
Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
In coalitional games, traditional coalitional game theory does not apply if different participants hold different opinions about the payoff function that corresponds to each subset of the coalition. In this paper, we propose a framework in…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
Contrary to the customary view that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium theorem in Game Theory is paradigmatic for non-cooperative games, it is shown that, in fact, it is essentially based on a particularly strong cooperation assumption.…
The game theory techniques are used to find the equilibrium of a market. Game theory refers to the ways in which strategic interactions among economic agents produce outcomes with respect to the preferences (or utilities) of those agents,…
A long-running difficulty with conventional game theory has been how to modify it to accommodate the bounded rationality of all real-world players. A recurring issue in statistical physics is how best to approximate joint probability…
Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…
Most work in game theory assumes that players are perfect reasoners and have common knowledge of all significant aspects of the game. In earlier work, we proposed a framework for representing and analyzing games with possibly unaware…
The game-theoretic risk management framework put forth in the precursor work "Towards a Theory of Games with Payoffs that are Probability-Distributions" (arXiv:1506.07368 [q-fin.EC]) is herein extended by algorithmic details on how to…
Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma…
In this note, we prove the existence of an equilibrium concept, dubbed conditional strategy equilibrium, for non-cooperative games in which a strategy of a player is a function from the other players' actions to her own actions. We study…
We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…
AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay…
When two or more self-interested agents put their plans to execution in the same environment, conflicts may arise as a consequence, for instance, of a common utilization of resources. In this case, an agent can postpone the execution of a…
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…