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In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…

We study a class of manipulations in combinatorial auctions where bidders fundamentally misrepresent what goods they are interested in. Prior work has largely assumed that bidders only submit bids on their bundles of interest, which we call…

We consider auction environments in which at the time of the auction bidders observe signals about their ex-post value. We introduce a model of novice bidders who do not know know the joint distribution of signals and instead build a…

We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each…

Traditional electric energy markets do not explicitly model generator contingencies. To improve the representation of resources and to enhance the modeling of uncertainty, existing markets are moving in the direction of including generator…

When opposing parties compete for a prize, the sunk effort players exert during the conflict can affect the value of the winner's reward. These spillovers can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in…

Large deployment of distribute energy resources and the increasing awareness of end-users towards their energy procurement are challenging current practices of electricity markets. A change of paradigm, from a top-down hierarchical approach…

Aiming to describe the wealth distribution evolution, several models consider an ensemble of interacting economic agents that exchange wealth in binary fashion. Intriguingly, models that consider an unbiased market, that gives to each agent…

We present detailed numerical results for a modified form of the so-called Minority Game, which provides a simplified model of a competitive market. Each agent has a limited set of strategies, and competes to be in a minority. An…

Generalization of the minority game to more than one market is considered. At each time step every agent chooses one of its strategies and acts on the market related to this strategy. If the payoff function allows for strong fluctuation of…

We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer's visit will glean. In the unique symmetric equilibrium…

Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…

We provide simple models for the utility function (or psychology) of an actor trading a multitude of goods for money. In this framework, money has no intrinsic consumption value, but is required as a medium of exchange. A collection of such…

We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in…

Prediction markets are often used as mechanisms to aggregate information about a future event, for example, whether a candidate will win an election. The event is typically assumed to be exogenous. In reality, participants may influence the…

We introduce a system of kinetic equations describing an exchange market consisting of two populations of agents (dealers and speculators) expressing the same preferences for two goods, but applying different strategies in their exchanges.…

Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while…

Large variations in stock prices happen with sufficient frequency to raise doubts about existing models, which all fail to account for non-Gaussian statistics. We construct simple models of a stock market, and argue that the large…

This paper models firm-to-firm trade in a production network as a set of double auctions. Firms have multilateral market power, namely, can affect prices in both input and output markets. The size and division of surplus are endogenous and…

Market power exercise in the electricity markets distorts market prices and diminishes social welfare. Many markets have implemented market power mitigation processes to eliminate the impact of such behavior. The design of mitigation…