Related papers: Social games in a social network
Population structure induced by both spatial embedding and more general networks of interaction, such as model social networks, have been shown to have a fundamental effect on the dynamics and outcome of evolutionary games. These effects…
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…
In this work we study the behavior of classical two-person, two-strategies evolutionary games on networks embedded in a Euclidean two-dimensional space with different kinds of degree distributions and topologies going from regular to…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
We study the effect of contingent movement on the persistence of cooperation on complex networks with empty nodes. Each agent plays Prisoner's Dilemma game with its neighbors and then it either updates the strategy depending on the payoff…
We study the possible advantages of adopting of quantum strategies in multi-player evolutionary games. We base our study on the three-player Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game. In order to model the simultaneous interaction between three agents…
We study an evolutionary version of the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where the agents are placed in a random graph. For lattices with fixed connectivity, $\alpha$, we show that for low values of $\alpha$ the final density of cooperating…
We explore the evolution of cooperation in the framework of the evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. We present a minimal model taking into account the growing process of the systems and…
In this article we discuss network growth based on Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) where palyers on nodes in a network palay with its linked players. The players estimate total profits in the PD. When a new node is attached, the node make linkes to…
In this work we have used computer models of social-like networks to show by extensive numerical simulations that cooperation in evolutionary games can emerge and be stable on this class of networks. The amounts of cooperation reached are…
We study a spatial two-strategy (cooperation and defection) Prisoner's Dilemma game with two types ($A$ and $B$) of players located on the sites of a square lattice. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by iterated strategy…
Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative…
We construct a model of strategic imitation in an arbitrary network of players who interact through an additive game. Assuming a discrete time update, we show a condition under which the resulting difference equations converge to consensus.…
Social learning algorithms provide models for the formation of opinions over social networks resulting from local reasoning and peer-to-peer exchanges. Interactions occur over an underlying graph topology, which describes the flow of…
The evolution of unconditional cooperation is one of the fundamental problems in science. A new solution is proposed to solve this puzzle. We treat this issue with an evolutionary model in which agents play the Prisoner's Dilemma on signed…
We address the problem of how the survival of cooperation in a social system depends on the motion of the individuals. Specifically, we study a model in which Prisoner's Dilemma players are allowed to move in a two-dimensional plane. Our…
We show that the resolution of social dilemmas on random graphs and scale-free networks is facilitated by imitating not the strategy of better performing players but rather their emotions. We assume sympathy and envy as the two emotions…
As a step towards studying human-agent collectives we conduct an online game with human participants cooperating on a network. The game is presented in the context of achieving group formation through local coordination. The players set…
We study the evolution of behavior under reinforcement learning in a Prisoner's Dilemma where agents interact in a regular network and can learn about whether they play one-shot or repeatedly by incurring a cost of deliberation. With…
In this paper, the Optional Prisoner's Dilemma game in a spatial environment, with coevolutionary rules for both the strategy and network links between agents, is studied. Using a Monte Carlo simulation approach, a number of experiments are…