Related papers: An exact analysis of stable allocation
We establish nonparametric identification of auction models with continuous and nonseparable unobserved heterogeneity using three consecutive order statistics of bids. We then propose sieve maximum likelihood estimators for the joint…
A central issue in ecology today is that of the factors determining the relative abundance of species within a natural community. The proper application of the principles of statistical physics to the problem of species abundance…
Distribution testing is a fundamental statistical task with many applications, but we are interested in a variety of problems where systematic mislabelings of the sample prevent us from applying the existing theory. To apply distribution…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
Ordinal regression falls between discrete-valued classification and continuous-valued regression. Ordinal target variables can be associated with ranked random variables. These random variables are known as order statistics and they are…
In selective classification (SC), a classifier abstains from making predictions that are likely to be wrong to avoid excessive errors. To deploy imperfect classifiers -- either due to intrinsic statistical noise of data or for robustness…
A taxonomy is a standardized framework to classify and organize items into categories. Hierarchical taxonomies are ubiquitous, ranging from the classification of organisms to the file system on a computer. Characterizing the typical…
In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…
Given a set of $n$ individuals with strict preferences over $m$ indivisible objects, the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism is a method for allocating objects to individuals in a way that is efficient, fair, and…
For massive and heterogeneous modern datasets, it is of fundamental interest to provide guarantees on the accuracy of estimation when computational resources are limited. In the application of learning to rank, we provide a hierarchy of…
This paper proposes a scoring-rule-based method for ranking predictive distributions in the Fr\'echet domain that is able to distinguish between different tail indices. The approach is built on normalized order statistics and exploits…
Lloyd Shapley's cooperative value allocation theory stands as a central concept in game theory, extensively utilized across various domains to distribute resources, evaluate individual contributions, and ensure fairness. The Shapley value…
Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik,…
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…
Rankings are ubiquitous across many applications, from search engines to hiring committees. In practice, many rankings are derived from the output of predictors. However, when predictors trained for classification tasks have intrinsic…
We introduce a novel method for defining geographic districts in road networks using stable matching. In this approach, each geographic district is defined in terms of a center, which identifies a location of interest, such as a post office…
We study tree-indexed random walks as introduced by Benjamini, H\"aggstr\"om, and Mossel, i.e. labelings of a tree for which adjacent vertices have labels differing by 1. It is a conjecture of those authors that the distribution of the…
We study a two-sided matching model where one side of the market (hospitals) has combinatorial preferences over the other side (doctors). Specifically, we consider the setting where hospitals have matroid rank valuations over the doctors,…
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with unequal entitlements. Fair allocation has been the subject of many studies in both divisible and indivisible settings. Our emphasis is on the case where the goods are indivisible…
In this paper we show that when individuals in a bipartite network exclusively choose partners and exchange valued goods with their partners, then there exists a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable. Pair-wise stability implies that…