Related papers: An exact analysis of stable allocation

We study stable allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods. The problem is well-known to be challenging, and rich enough to encode fundamentally unstable economies, such as the roommate problem. Our approach stems from…

Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…

In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is the following: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that…

The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…

Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…

Attribution scores reflect how important the feature values in an input entity are for the output of a machine learning model. One of the most popular attribution scores is the SHAP score, which is an instantiation of the general Shapley…

In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain.…

We study the classic house-swapping problem of Shapley and Scarf (1974) in a setting where agents may have "objective" indifferences, i.e., indifferences that are shared by all agents. In other words, if any one agent is indifferent between…

We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…

Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…

Decision making is challenging when there is more than one criterion to consider. In such cases, it is common to assign a goodness score to each item as a weighted sum of its attribute values and rank them accordingly. Clearly, the ranking…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible objects to a set of rational agents where each agent's final utility depends on the intrinsic valuation of the allocated item as well as the allocation within the agent's local neighbourhood.…

We formalize an allocation model under ordinal preferences that is more general than the well-studied Shapley-Scarf housing market. In our model, the agents do not just care which house or resource they get but also care about who gets…

Numerous works propose post-hoc, model-agnostic explanations for learning to rank, focusing on ordering entities by their relevance to a query through feature attribution methods. However, these attributions often weakly correlate or…

We introduce a new class of network allocation games called graphical distance preservation games. Here, we are given a graph, called a topology, and a set of agents that need to be allocated to its vertices. Moreover, every agent has an…

Algorithmic decisions in critical domains such as hiring, college admissions, and lending are often based on rankings. Given the impact of these decisions on individuals, organizations, and population groups, it is essential to understand…

Sequential allocation is a simple mechanism for sharing multiple indivisible items. We study strategic behavior in sequential allocation. In particular, we consider Nash dynamics, as well as the computation and Pareto optimality of pure…

We study the question of existence and fast computation of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible resources among agents with additive valuations. As such allocations may not exist for arbitrary instances, we ask if they exist for…

In their seminal work on the Stable Marriage Problem, Gale and Shapley describe an algorithm which finds a stable matching in $O(n^2)$ communication rounds. Their algorithm has a natural interpretation as a distributed algorithm where each…

Suppose each of $n$ men and $n$ women is located at a point in a metric space. A woman ranks the men in order of their distance to her from closest to farthest, breaking ties at random. The men rank the women similarly. An interesting…