Related papers: On the value of optimal stopping games
We study two-player zero-sum stopping games in continuous time and infinite horizon. We prove that the value in randomized stopping times exists as soon as the payoff processes are right-continuous. In particular, as opposed to existing…
We consider a zero-sum continuous time stopping game in which the pay-off is revealed in the maximum of the two stopping times instead of the minimum, which is the case in Dynkin games.
We consider multi-player stopping games in continuous time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after all the players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy by observing other…
We introduce a new non-zero-sum game of optimal stopping with asymmetric exercise opportunities. Given a stochastic process modelling the value of an asset, one player observes and can act on the process continuously, while the other player…
Three notions of random stopping times exist in the literature. We introduce two concepts of equivalence of random stopping times, motivated by optimal stopping problems and stopping games respectively. We prove that these two concepts…
Sellers in online markets face the challenge of determining the right time to sell in view of uncertain future offers. Classical stopping theory assumes that sellers have full knowledge of the value distributions, and leverage this…
In this article we study an optimal stopping/optimal control problem which models the decision facing a risk-averse agent over when to sell an asset. The market is incomplete so that the asset exposure cannot be hedged. In addition to the…
We study a model of two-player, zero-sum, stopping games with asymmetric information. We assume that the payoff depends on two continuous-time Markov chains (X, Y), where X is only observed by player 1 and Y only by player 2, implying that…
A multi-player competitive Dynkin stopping game is constructed. Each player can either exit the game for a fixed payoff, determined a priori, or stay and receive an adjusted payoff depending on the decision of other players. The single…
We consider two-player non-zero-sum stopping games in discrete time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after both players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy according to…
We study the existence of optimal actions in a zero-sum game $\inf_{\tau}\sup_PE^P[X_{\tau}]$ between a stopper and a controller choosing a probability measure. This includes the optimal stopping problem $\inf_{\tau}\mathcal{E}(X_{\tau})$…
We study the problem of selling an asset near its ultimate maximum in the minimax setting. The regret-based notion of a perfect stopping time is introduced. A perfect stopping time is uniquely characterized by its optimality properties and…
For an infinite-horizon continuous-time optimal stopping problem under non-exponential discounting, we look for an optimal equilibrium, which generates larger values than any other equilibrium does on the entire state space. When the…
This paper uses recent results on continuous-time finite-horizon optimal switching problems with negative switching costs to prove the existence of a saddle point in an optimal stopping (Dynkin) game. Sufficient conditions for the game's…
We first study an optimal stopping problem in which a player (an agent) uses a discrete stopping time in order to stop optimally a payoff process whose risk is evaluated by a (non-linear) $g$-expectation. We then consider a non-zero-sum…
In this paper we introduce and solve a class of optimal stopping problems of recursive type. In particular, the stopping payoff depends directly on the value function of the problem itself. In a multi-dimensional Markovian setting we show…
We consider the mean-field game where each agent determines the optimal time to exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with reward function depending on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game.…
This paper examines finite zero-sum stochastic games and demonstrates that when the game's duration is sufficiently long, there exists a pair of approximately optimal strategies such that the expected average payoff at any point in the game…
We consider the general model of zero-sum repeated games (or stochastic games with signals), and assume that one of the players is fully informed and controls the transitions of the state variable. We prove the existence of the uniform…
We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time admits an epsilon-equilibrium in randomized stopping times. We provide a condition that ensures the existence of an epsilon-equilibrium in non-randomized stopping…