Related papers: Monotonic Sequence Games
Any nonempty, compact, semi-algebraic set in [0, 1] n is the projection of the set of mixed equilibria of a finite game with 2 actions per player on its first n coordinates. A similar result follows for sets of equilibrium payoffs. The…
In this paper we study a linear pursuit differential game described by an infinite system of first-order differential equations in Hilbert space. The control functions of players are subject to geometric constraints. The pursuer attempts to…
The usual $n$-in-a-row game is a positional game in which two player alternately claim points in $\bb{Z}^2$ with the winner being the first player to claim $n$ consecutive points in a line. We consider a variant of the game, suggested by…
This brief paper describes the single-player card game called "Perpetual Motion" and reports on a computational analysis of the game's outcome. The analysis follows a Monte Carlo methodology based on a sample of 10,000 randomly generated…
The relationship between topology and dynamics of complex systems has motivated continuing interest from the scientific community. In the present work, we address this interesting topic from the perspective of simple games, involving two…
We consider a dynamical approach to sequential games. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction…
We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The informed player observes the realization of a Markov chain on which the payoffs…
Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…
In this paper, we examine the convergence landscape of multi-agent learning under uncertainty. Specifically, we analyze two stochastic models of regularized learning in continuous games -- one in continuous and one in discrete time with the…
A zero-one matrix $A$ contains another zero-one matrix $P$ if some submatrix of $A$ can be transformed to $P$ by changing some ones to zeros. $A$ avoids $P$ if $A$ does not contain $P$. The Pattern Avoidance Game is played by two players.…
A monotone function interval is the set of monotone functions that lie pointwise between two fixed monotone functions. We characterize the set of extreme points of monotone function intervals and apply this to a number of economic settings.…
We study variations of classical combinatorial games on two finite heaps of tokens, a.k.a. \emph{subtraction games}. Given non-negative integers $p_1,q_1, p_2,q_2$, where $p_1q_2 > q_1p_2$, $p_1>0$ and $q_2>0$, two players alternate in…
We give an example of a finite-state two-player turn-based stochastic game with safety objectives for both players which has no stationary Nash equilibrium. This answers an open question of Secchi and Sudderth.
In this note, we investigate combinatorial games where both players move randomly (each turn, independently selecting a legal move uniformly at random). In this model, we provide closed-form expressions for the expected number of turns in a…
We start with the well-known game below: Two players hold a sheet of paper to their forehead on which a positive integer is written. The numbers are consecutive and each player can only see the number of the other one. In each time step,…
We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…
Inspired by asynchronous cooperative Parrondo's games we introduce two new types of games in which all players simultaneously play game A or game B or a combination of these two games. These two types of games differ in the way a…
We study stochastic evolution of optional games on simple graphs. There are two strategies, A and B, whose interaction is described by a general payoff matrix. In addition there are one or several possibilities to opt out from the game by…
We study solution concepts for normal-form games. We obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria and logit quantal response equilibria, as well as generalizations capturing non-expected utility. Our axioms reflect that players are…
We examine the long-run behavior of a wide range of dynamics for learning in nonatomic games, in both discrete and continuous time. The class of dynamics under consideration includes fictitious play and its regularized variants, the…