Related papers: Putting the prisoner's dilemma in context
Recent experimental evidence [Gruji\'c et al., PLoS ONE 5, e13749 (2010)] on the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma suggests that players choosing to cooperate or not on the basis of their previous action and the actions of their neighbors coexist…
The paper studies the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior in populations of agents who interact among themselves in Prisoner's Dilemma games and who are allowed to choose their partners. The population is then subject to…
A simple model for cooperation between "selfish" agents, which play an extended version of the Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) game, in which they use arbitrary payoffs, is presented and studied. A continuous variable, representing the probability…
In human societies the probability of strategy adoption from a given person may be affected by the personal features. Now we investigate how an artificially imposed restricted ability to reproduce, overruling ones fitness, affects an…
Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game is studied where initially all players are linked via a regular graph, having four neighbors each. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players are allowed to make new…
An active participation of players in evolutionary games depends on several factors, ranging from personal stakes to the properties of the interaction network. Diverse activity patterns thus have to be taken into account when studying the…
The prisoner's dilemma (PD) game is a simple model for understanding cooperative patterns in complex systems consisting of selfish individuals. Here, we study a PD game problem in scale-free networks containing hierarchically organized…
In this paper I present a mathematically novel approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma. I do so by first defining recursively a distinct action type, what I call 'universalizing', that I add to the original prisoner's dilemma. Such a modified…
Introducing strategy complexity into the basic conflict of cooperation and defection is a natural response to avoid the tragedy of the common state. As an intermediate approach, quasi-cooperators were recently suggested to address the…
This paper examines the integration of computational complexity into game theoretic models. The example focused on is the Prisoner's Dilemma, repeated for a finite length of time. We show that a minimal bound on the players' computational…
Individuals might abstain from participating in an instance of an evolutionary game for various reasons, ranging from lack of interest to risk aversion. In order to understand the consequences of such diverse activity patterns on the…
Human decision behaviour is quite diverse. In many games humans on average do not achieve maximal payoff and the behaviour of individual players remains inhomogeneous even after playing many rounds. For instance, in repeated prisoner…
The prisoner's dilemma game is the most known contribution of game theory into social sciences. Here we describe new implications of this game for transactional and transformative leadership. While the autocratic (Stackelberg's) leadership…
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple model that captures the essential contradiction between individual rationality and global rationality. Although the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma is usually viewed simple, in this paper we will categorize it…
Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…
The Prisoner's Dilemma is used as a model in processes involving reciprocity; however, its classical setup can be insufficient in settings where the symmetry of the simultaneous decision making is broken -- for example, in donor and…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…
It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive…
We study the evolution of cooperation in populations where individuals play prisoner's dilemma on a network. Every node of the network corresponds on an individual choosing whether to cooperate or defect in a repeated game. The players…
We investigate the spatial distribution and the global frequency of agents who can either cooperate or defect. The agent interaction is described by a deterministic, non-iterated prisoner's dilemma game, further each agent only locally…