Universalized Prisoner's Dilemma With Risk
Abstract
In this paper I present a mathematically novel approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma. I do so by first defining recursively a distinct action type, what I call 'universalizing', that I add to the original prisoner's dilemma. Such a modified version of the Prisoner's Dilemma provides a very food productive model of the choices that would be made in a prisoner's dilemma by agents who trust each other. As I show, players playing a universalized prisoner's dilemma get as far out of the dilemma as is mathematically possible. I then add the concept of risk to the universalized version of prisoner's dilemma. Doing so provide a model that is sensitive to the trustworthiness of the agents in any prisoner's dilemma. As I show, with no risk, agents get out of the prisoners dilemma; and with maximal risk, the succumb to it. succumb to it.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1510.00665,
title = {Universalized Prisoner's Dilemma With Risk},
author = {Paul Studtmann},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1510.00665},
year = {2015}
}
Comments
Includes four pages of Mathematica worksheets that verify the mathematical claims made in the paper