Related papers: Stopping games in continuous time
For two-person dynamic zero-sum games (both discrete and continuous settings), we investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity and the limit of value…
In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…
We study the existence of optimal actions in a zero-sum game $\inf_{\tau}\sup_PE^P[X_{\tau}]$ between a stopper and a controller choosing a probability measure. This includes the optimal stopping problem $\inf_{\tau}\mathcal{E}(X_{\tau})$…
This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…
We consider 2-player zero-sum stochastic games where each player controls his own state variable living in a compact metric space. The terminology comes from gambling problems where the state of a player represents its wealth in a casino.…
In this paper, a large class of time-varying Riccati equations arising in stochastic dynamic games is considered. The problem of the existence and uniqueness of some globally defined solution, namely the bounded and stabilizing solution, is…
On a filtered probability space $(\Omega,\mathcal{F},P,\mathbb{F}=(\mathcal{F}_t)_{t=0,\dotso,T})$, we consider stopper-stopper games $\overline V:=\inf_{\Rho\in\bT^{ii}}\sup_{\tau\in\T}\E[U(\Rho(\tau),\tau)]$ and $\underline…
The paper proposes a natural measure space of zero-sum perfect information games with upper semicontinuous payoffs. Each game is specified by the game tree, and by the assignment of the active player and of the capacity to each node of the…
This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games in which every player has a private type that is unknown to the other player, and the initial probability of the type of every player is publicly known. The types of players are…
In this paper, we consider a differential stochastic zero-sum game in which two players intervene by adopting impulse controls in a finite time horizon. We provide a numerical solution as an approximation of the value function, which turns…
Stochastic games are an important class of problems that generalize Markov decision processes to game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state two-player zero-sum stochastic games over an infinite time horizon with discounted rewards.…
We introduce two-level discounted games played by two players on a perfect-information stochastic game graph. The upper level game is a discounted game and the lower level game is an undiscounted reachability game. Two-level games model…
In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…
n infinite two-player zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent's actions are monitored eventually but not necessarily immediately after they are played, is determined. The proof relies on a representation of the game as…
Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games, where the…
We study a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games known as \textit{blind stochastic games}, where players neither observe the state nor receive any information about it during the game. A central concept for analyzing long-duration…
We analyze an optimal stopping problem with random maturity under a nonlinear expectation with respect to a weakly compact set of mutually singular probabilities $\mathcal{P}$. The maturity is specified as the hitting time to level $0$ of…
This paper is concerned with a linear quadratic stochastic two-person zero-sum differential game with constant coefficients in an infinite time horizon. Open-loop and closed-loop saddle points are introduced. The existence of closed-loop…
Mertens [In Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians (Berkeley, Calif., 1986) (1987) 1528-1577 Amer. Math. Soc.] proposed two general conjectures about repeated games: the first one is that, in any two-person zero-sum…
In the paper we consider the controlled continuous-time Markov chain describing the interacting particles system with the finite number of types. The system is controlled by two players with the opposite purposes. The limiting game as the…