Related papers: Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
We formalize a framework for coordinating funding and selecting projects, the costs of which are shared among agents with quasi-linear utility functions and individual budgets. Our model contains the classical discrete participatory…
We study fair mechanisms for the classic job scheduling problem on unrelated machines with the objective of minimizing the makespan. This problem is equivalent to minimizing the egalitarian social cost in the fair division of chores. The…
Mechanism design for one-sided markets has been investigated for several decades in economics and in computer science. More recently, there has been an increased attention on mechanisms for two-sided markets, in which buyers and sellers act…
We consider incentive compatible mechanisms for a domain that is very close to the domain of scheduling $n$ unrelated machines: the single exception is that the valuation of just one machine is submodular. For the scheduling problem with…
In a cost sharing problem on a weighted undirected graph, all other nodes want to connect to the source node for some service. Each edge has a cost denoted by a weight and all the connected nodes should share the total cost for the…
We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common economic situations, and yet it has not been studied, to our…
While load balancing in distributed-memory computing has been well-studied, we present an innovative approach to this problem: a unified, reduced-order model that combines three key components to describe "work" in a distributed system:…
We study the design of efficient mechanisms under asymmetric awareness and information. Unawareness refers to the lack of conception rather than the lack of information. Assuming quasi-linear utilities and private values, we show that we…
This paper studies line planning for urban bus networks that face multiple resource limits such as budget, labor, and emission caps while using heterogeneous fleets. The objective is to maximize total reward from serving passengers by…
CMO Council reports that 71\% of internet users in the U.S. were influenced by coupons and discounts when making their purchase decisions. It has also been shown that offering coupons to a small fraction of users (called seed users) may…
We initiate the work on fair and strategyproof allocation of indivisible chores. The fairness concept we consider in this paper is maxmin share (MMS) fairness. We consider three previously studied models of information elicited from the…
In this work, we consider robust submodular maximization with matroid constraints. We give an efficient bi-criteria approximation algorithm that outputs a small family of feasible sets whose union has (nearly) optimal objective value. This…
Reasoning about uncertainty is vital in many real-life autonomous systems. However, current state-of-the-art planning algorithms cannot either reason about uncertainty explicitly, or do so with a high computational burden. Here, we focus on…
We study a participatory budgeting problem of aggregating the preferences of agents and dividing a budget over the projects. A budget division solution is a probability distribution over the projects. The main purpose of our study concerns…
We study efficiency and budget balance for designing mechanisms in general quasi-linear domains. Green and Laffont (1979) proved that one cannot generically achieve both. We consider strategyproof budget-balanced mechanisms that are…
We consider collaborative systems where users make contributions across multiple available projects and are rewarded for their contributions in individual projects according to a local sharing of the value produced. This serves as a model…
In this paper, we rigorously study the problem of cost optimisation of hybrid (mixed) institutional incentives, which are a plan of actions involving the use of reward and punishment by an external decision-maker, for maximising the level…
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret,…
Recombining trinomial trees are a workhorse for modeling discrete-event systems in option pricing, logistics, and feedback control. Because each node stores a state-dependent quantity, a depth-$D$ tree naively yields $\mathcal{O}(3^{D})$…
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms…