Related papers: Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
In this paper we consider spatial networks that realize a balance between an infrastructure cost (the cost of wire needed to connect the network in space) and communication efficiency, measured by average shortest pathlength. A global…
Optimal stopping is the problem of deciding when to stop a stochastic system to obtain the greatest reward, arising in numerous application areas such as finance, healthcare and marketing. State-of-the-art methods for high-dimensional…
In this paper, a cooperative task computation framework exploits the computation resource in UEs to accomplish more tasks meanwhile minimizes the power consumption of UEs. The system cost includes the cost of UEs' power consumption and the…
Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is an appealing concept as it allows to maintain incentive compatibility even in the presence of agents that are not fully rational, e.g., those who struggle with contingent reasoning [Li, 2015]. However, it…
Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interested in buying goods or services from a group of strategic…
The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed and applied to many real-life application domains. As the theory has been applied to increasingly diverse types of environments, researchers and practitioners have encountered…
This paper presents a workforce planning model scalable to an entire hierarchical organization. Its main objective is to design a cost optimal target which leverages flexible workforce solutions while ensuring an efficient promotional flux.…
We propose a communication-efficient optimally structured gradient coding scheme to jointly address straggler resilience and communication efficiency in heterogeneous distributed learning. By establishing a unified framework that…
In this paper we present efficient algorithmic solutions for several constrained resource allocation, management and discovery problems. We consider new types of resource allocation models and constraints, and we present new geometric…
We introduce a heterogeneous connection model for network formation to capture the effect of cost heterogeneity on the structure of efficient networks. In the proposed model, connection costs are assumed to be separable, which means the…
Electric mobility faces several challenges, most notably the high cost of infrastructure development and the underutilization of charging stations. The concept of shared charging offers a promising solution. The paper explores sustainable…
We introduce a modular framework for market making. It combines cost-function based automated market makers with bandit algorithms. We obtain worst-case profits guarantee's relative to the best in hindsight within a class of natural…
We consider k-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to k facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize his connection cost, given by a nonnegative increasing function…
We investigate two new optimization problems -- minimizing a submodular function subject to a submodular lower bound constraint (submodular cover) and maximizing a submodular function subject to a submodular upper bound constraint…
We compare the expected efficiency of revenue maximizing (or {\em optimal}) mechanisms with that of efficiency maximizing ones. We show that the efficiency of the revenue maximizing mechanism for selling a single item with k + log_{e/(e-1)}…
We consider running-time optimization for band-joins in a distributed system, e.g., the cloud. To balance load across worker machines, input has to be partitioned, which causes duplication. We explore how to resolve this tension between…
We initiate the work on maximin share (MMS) fair allocation of m indivisible chores to n agents using only their ordinal preferences, from both algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. The previous best-known approximation is 2-1/n by…
In budget-feasible mechanism design, a buyer wishes to procure a set of items of maximum value from self-interested players. We have a valuation function $v:2^U \to \mathbb{R}_+$, where $U$ is the set of all items, where $v(S)$ specifies…
We study the facility location problems where agents are located on a real line and divided into groups based on criteria such as ethnicity or age. Our aim is to design mechanisms to locate a facility to approximately minimize the costs of…
We study a generalization of the standard approval-based model of participatory budgeting (PB), in which voters are providing approval ballots over a set of predefined projects and -- in addition to a global budget limit, there are several…