Related papers: Defensive forecasting for linear protocols
Conformal prediction is a learning framework controlling prediction coverage of prediction sets, which can be built on any learning algorithm for point prediction. This work proposes a learning framework named conformal loss-controlling…
We consider the problem of rational secret sharing introduced by Halpern and Teague [1], where the players involved in secret sharing play only if it is to their advantage. This can be characterized in the form of preferences. Players would…
We propose an end-to-end differentiable training paradigm for stable training of a rationalized transformer classifier. Our approach results in a single model that simultaneously classifies a sample and scores input tokens based on their…
We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…
We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each…
In the same sense as classical logic is a formal theory of truth, the recently initiated approach called computability logic is a formal theory of computability. It understands (interactive) computational problems as games played by a…
Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy…
We introduce the use of conservation laws to develop strategies in multi-player consensus games. First, basic well posedness results provide a reliable analytic setting. Then, a general non anticipative strategy is proposed through its…
We propose and analyze a novel theoretical and algorithmic framework for structured prediction. While so far the term has referred to discrete output spaces, here we consider more general settings, such as manifolds or spaces of probability…
Over a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes invited scholars to look at the law through the lens of probability theory: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." Yet few…
We develop a communication-theoretic framework for privacy-aware and resilient decision making in cyber-physical systems under misaligned objectives between the encoder and the decoder. The encoder observes two correlated signals…
The vulnerability of machine learning models to adversarial attacks remains a critical security challenge. Traditional defenses, such as adversarial training, typically robustify models by minimizing a worst-case loss. However, these…
Models necessarily capture only parts of a reality. Prediction models aim at capturing a future reality. In this paper we address the question of how the future is constructed (or: imagined) in an investment context where market…
We study the problem of prediction with expert advice with adversarial corruption where the adversary can at most corrupt one expert. Using tools from viscosity theory, we characterize the long-time behavior of the value function of the…
Learned time-series models, whether continuous or discrete, are widely used for forecasting the states of dynamical systems but suffer from error accumulation in multi-step forecasts. To address this issue, we propose a Predictor-Corrector…
Strategic classification(SC) studies the interaction between decision models and agents who strategically manipulate their features for favorable outcomes. Existing SC frameworks typically rely on the idealized assumption that agents are…
In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of…
This paper is part of an emerging line of work at the intersection of machine learning and mechanism design, which aims to avoid noise in training data by correctly aligning the incentives of data sources. Specifically, we focus on the…
The Stackelberg game model, where a leader commits to a strategy and the follower best responds, has found widespread application, particularly to security problems. In the security setting, the goal is for the leader to compute an optimal…
We study linear quadratic dynamic games where players are uncertain about each other's control policies or goals and consequently seek to be strategically robust. Building on recent work on strategically robust and risk-averse game theory,…