English

A Bayesian Model of the Litigation Game

Economics 2015-06-26 v1

Abstract

Over a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes invited scholars to look at the law through the lens of probability theory: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." Yet few legal scholars have taken up this intriguing invitation. As such, in place of previous approaches to the study of law, this paper presents a non-normative, mathematical approach to law and the legal process. Specifically, we present a formal Bayesian model of civil and criminal litigation, or what we refer to as the litigation game; that is, instead of focusing on the rules of civil or criminal procedure or substantive legal doctrine, we ask and attempt to answer a mathematical question: what is the posterior probability that a defendant in a civil or criminal trial will be found liable, given that the defendant has, in fact, committed a wrongful act?

Cite

@article{arxiv.1506.07854,
  title  = {A Bayesian Model of the Litigation Game},
  author = {Enrique Guerra-Pujol},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1506.07854},
  year   = {2015}
}

Comments

24 pages, 1 table

R2 v1 2026-06-22T10:00:25.563Z