Related papers: Stable Outcomes for Two-Sided Contract Choice Prob…
We study a decentralized matching market in which firms sequentially make offers to potential workers. For each offer, the worker can choose "accept" or "reject," but the decision is irrevocable. The acceptance of an offer guarantees her…
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…
Motivated by the recent popularity of machine learning training services, we introduce a contract design problem in which a provider sells a service that results in an outcome of uncertain quality for the buyer. The seller has a set of…
We consider a coalition formation setting where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition. This setting differs from…
Contract scheduling is a general technique that allows to design a system with interruptible capabilities, given an algorithm that is not necessarily interruptible. Previous work on this topic has largely assumed that the interruption is a…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
We investigate a coordination model for a two-stage collective decision-making problem within the framework of global games. The agents observe noisy signals of a shared random variable, referred to as the fundamental, which determines the…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
Energy or time-efficient scheduling is of particular interest in wireless communications, with applications in sensor network design, cellular communications, and more. In many cases, wireless packets to be transmitted have deadlines that…
Vickrey's classic single-bottleneck departure time choice equilibrium model exhibits instability under many plausible day-to-day learning dynamics. Such instability is not observed in reality -- does this difference stem from the day-to-day…
Consider a cyclically ordered collection of $r$ equinumerous agent sets with strict preferences of every agent over the agents from the next agent set. A weakly stable cyclic matching is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint union…
We study the problem of vertex-weighted online bipartite matching with stochastic rewards where matches may fail with some known probability and the decision maker has to adapt to the sequential realization of these outcomes. Recent works…
The stable matching problem has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since the seminal 1962 paper by Gale and Shapley. The number of stable matchings for different systems of preferences has been studied in many…
We propose here a two-round relativistic bit commitment scheme where committer commits in the first round and then confirms his/her commitment in the second round. The scheme offers indefinite commitment time where both committer and…
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…
Following up on purely theoretical work of Bredereck et al. [AAAI 2020], we contribute further theoretical insights into adapting stable two-sided matchings to change. Moreover, we perform extensive empirical studies hinting at numerous…
We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in each realization is always optimal, and that such pairwise…
Infinite horizon optimal stopping problems for a L\'evy processes with a two-sided reward function are considered. A two-sided verification theorem is presented in terms of the overall supremum and the overall infimum of the process. A…
The paper considers the problem of multi-objective decision support when outcomes are uncertain. We extend the concept of Pareto-efficient decisions to take into account the uncertainty of decision outcomes across varying contexts. This…
We study the Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorces (DivorceSM) problem of deciding, given a Stable Marriage instance and an initial matching $M$ , whether there exists a stable matching which is reachable from $M$ by divorce operations as…