Related papers: Programming and Verifying Subgame Perfect Mechanis…
Many learning algorithms are known to converge to an equilibrium for specific classes of games if the same learning algorithm is adopted by all agents. However, when the agents are self-interested, a natural question is whether agents have…
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its…
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its…
This paper presents an example of formal reasoning about the semantics of a Prolog program of practical importance (the SAT solver of Howe and King). The program is treated as a definite clause logic program with added control. The logic…
We design two mechanisms that ensure that the majority preferred option wins in all equilibria. The first one is a simultaneous game where agents choose other agents to cooperate with on top of the vote for an alternative, thus overcoming…
We define a game semantics for second order classical arithmetic PA2 (with quantifiers over predicates on integers and full comprehension axiom). Our semantics is effective: moves are described by a finite amount of information and whenever…
We present a game semantics for Linear Logic, in which formulas denote games and proofs denote winning strategies. We show that our semantics yields a categorical model of Linear Logic and prove full completeness for Multiplicative Linear…
LLM-driven multi-agent-based simulations have been gaining traction with applications in game-theoretic and social simulations. While most implementations seek to exploit or evaluate LLM-agentic reasoning, they often do so with a weak…
Rational verification refers to the problem of checking which temporal logic properties hold of a concurrent multiagent system, under the assumption that agents in the system choose strategies that form a game-theoretic equilibrium.…
Argumentation is one of the most popular approaches of defining a~non-monotonic formalism and several argumentation based semantics were proposed for defeasible logic programs. Recently, a new approach based on notions of conflict…
We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…
We study voting games on binary issues, where voters hold an objective over the outcome of the collective decision and are allowed, before the vote takes place, to negotiate their voting strategy with the other participants. We analyse the…
We show open games cover extensive form games with both perfect and imperfect information. Doing so forces us to address two current weaknesses in open games: the lack of a notion of player and their agency within open games, and the lack…
Control problems not admitting the dynamic programming principle are known as time-inconsistent. The game-theoretic approach is to interpret such problems as intrapersonal dynamic games and look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria. A…
Hoare-style program logics are a popular and effective technique for software verification. Relational program logics are an instance of this approach that enables reasoning about relationships between the execution of two or more programs.…
We present a functional framework for automated mechanism design based on a two-stage game model of strategic interaction between the designer and the mechanism participants, and apply it to several classes of two-player infinite games of…
Most modern (classical) programming languages support recursion. Recursion has also been successfully applied to the design of several quantum algorithms and introduced in a couple of quantum programming languages. So, it can be expected…
We introduce an extension of first-order logic that comes equipped with additional predicates for reasoning about an abstract state. Sequents in the logic comprise a main formula together with pre- and postconditions in the style of Hoare…
We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…
We investigate an algorithm that assigns to any game in normal form an approximating game that admits an ordinal potential function. Due to the properties of potential games, the algorithm equips every game with a surrogate reward structure…