Related papers: Programming and Verifying Subgame Perfect Mechanis…
We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers $\{\ldots,-2,-1,0\}$. We define two related equilibrium concepts: one considering only deviations…
An agent trained within a closed system can master any desired capability, as long as the following three conditions hold: (a) it receives sufficiently informative and aligned feedback, (b) its coverage of experience/data is broad enough,…
We apply Blackwell optimality to repeated games. An equilibrium whose strategy profile is sequentially rational for all high enough discount factors simultaneously is a Blackwell (subgame-perfect, perfect public, etc.) equilibrium. The bite…
Decomposition methods are often used for producing counterfactual predictions in non-strategic settings. When the outcome of interest arises from a game-theoretic setting where agents are better off by deviating from their strategies after…
We propose a general definition of perfect equilibrium which is applicable to a wide class of games. A key feature is the concept of completely mixed nets of strategies, based on a more detailed notion of carrier of a strategy. Under…
There are many combinatorial games in which a move can terminate the game, such as a checkmate in chess. These moves give rise to diverse situations that fall outside the scope of the classical normal play structure. To analyze these games,…
A notion of incentive for agents is introduced which leads to a very general notion of an equilibrium for a finite game. Sufficient conditions for the existence of these equilibria are given. Known existence theorems are shown to be…
Synthesizing programs from examples requires searching over a vast, combinatorial space of possible programs. In this search process, a key challenge is representing the behavior of a partially written program before it can be executed, to…
We define a new concept of "mistake" strategies and actions for strategic-form and extensive-form games, analyze the relationship to prior main game-theoretic solution concepts, study algorithms for computation, and explore practicality.…
Game semantics aim at describing the interactive behaviour of proofs by interpreting formulas as games on which proofs induce strategies. In this article, we introduce a game semantics for a fragment of first order propositional logic. One…
Goedel's completeness theorem is concerned with provability, while Girard's theorem in ludics (as well as full completeness theorems in game semantics) are concerned with proofs. Our purpose is to look for a connection between these two…
Game theory provides an effective way to model strategic interactions among rational agents. In the context of formal verification, these ideas can be used to produce guarantees on the correctness of multi-agent systems, with a diverse…
Traditional solvable game theory and mean-field-type game theory (risk-aware games) predominantly focus on quadratic costs due to their analytical tractability. Nevertheless, they often fail to capture critical non-linearities inherent in…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
We investigate the existence of certain types of equilibria (Nash, $\varepsilon$-Nash, subgame perfect, $\varepsilon$-subgame perfect, Pareto-optimal) in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games. We use two fundamental…
In this paper we treat the specification problem in classical realizability (as defined in [20]) in the case of arithmetical formul{\ae}. In the continuity of [10] and [11], we characterize the universal realizers of a formula as being the…
This paper provides effective methods for the polyhedral formulation of impartial finite combinatorial games as lattice games. Given a rational strategy for a lattice game, a polynomial time algorithm is presented to decide (i) whether a…
In this paper we study the complexity of strategic argumentation for dialogue games. A dialogue game is a 2-player game where the parties play arguments. We show how to model dialogue games in a skeptical, non-monotonic formalism, and we…
The article introduces a notion of a stochastic game with failure states and proposes two logical systems with modality "coalition has a strategy to transition to a non-failure state with a given probability while achieving a given goal."…
We introduce APPL (Abstract Program Property Logic), a unifying Hoare-style logic that subsumes standard Hoare logic, incorrectness logic, and several variants of Hyper Hoare logic. APPL provides a principled foundation for abstract program…