Related papers: Belief Revision and Rational Inference
We provide a semantic characterization of AGM belief contraction based on frames consisting of a Kripke belief relation and a Stalnaker-Lewis selection function. The central idea is as follows. Let K be the initial belief set and K-A be the…
I propose a framework for an agent to change its probabilistic beliefs when a new piece of propositional information $\alpha$ is observed. Traditionally, belief change occurs by either a revision process or by an update process, depending…
We introduce a novel class of adjustment rules for a collection of beliefs. This is an extension of Lewis' imaging to absorb probabilistic evidence in generalized settings. Unlike standard tools for belief revision, our proposal may be used…
Belief fusion is the principle of combining separate beliefs or bodies of evidence originating from different sources. Depending on the situation to be modelled, different belief fusion methods can be applied. Cumulative and averaging…
Belief revision is the task of modifying a knowledge base when new information becomes available, while also respecting a number of desirable properties. Classical belief revision schemes have been already specialised to \emph{binary…
Within the formal setting of the Lockean thesis, an agent belief set is defined in terms of degrees of confidence and these are described in probabilistic terms. This approach is of established interest, notwithstanding some limitations…
The idea of preserving conditional beliefs emerged recently as a new paradigm apt to guide the revision of epistemic states. Conditionals are substantially different from propositional beliefs and need specific treatment. In this paper, we…
The general use of subjective probabilities to model belief has been justified using many axiomatic schemes. For example, ?consistent betting behavior' arguments are well-known. To those not already convinced of the unique fitness and…
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. Roughly, revision treats a surprising observation…
In general, the best explanation for a given observation makes no promises on how good it is with respect to other alternative explanations. A major deficiency of message-passing schemes for belief revision in Bayesian networks is their…
In this paper we formalise three types of cognitive bias within the framework of belief revision: confirmation bias, framing bias, and anchoring bias. We interpret them generally, as restrictions on the process of iterated revision, and we…
Theory revision integrates inductive learning and background knowledge by combining training examples with a coarse domain theory to produce a more accurate theory. There are two challenges that theory revision and other theory-guided…
We propose a method for an agent to revise its incomplete probabilistic beliefs when a new piece of propositional information is observed. In this work, an agent's beliefs are represented by a set of probabilistic formulae -- a belief base.…
We consider the two-fold problem of representing collective beliefs and aggregating these beliefs. We propose modular, transitive relations for collective beliefs. They allow us to represent conflicting opinions and they have a clear…
In earlier work, we introduced flexible inference and decision-theoretic metareasoning to address the intractability of normative inference. Here, rather than pursuing the task of computing beliefs and actions with decision models composed…
Optimizing the phrasing of argumentative text is crucial in higher education and professional development. However, assessing whether and how the different claims in a text should be revised is a hard task, especially for novice writers. In…
Building on the analysis of Bonanno (Artificial Intelligence, 2025) we introduce a simple modal logic containing three modal operators: a unimodal belief operator, a bimodal conditional operator and the unimodal global operator. For each…
Our approach is basically a coherence approach, but we avoid the well-known pitfalls of coherence theories of truth. Consistency is replaced by reliability, which expresses support and attack, and, in principle, every theory (or agent,…
This paper deals with the revision of partially ordered beliefs. It proposes a semantic representation of epistemic states by partial pre-orders on interpretations and a syntactic representation by partially ordered belief bases. Two…
The widely claimed replicability crisis in science may lead to revised standards of significance. The customary frequentist confidence intervals, calibrated through hypothetical repetitions of the experiment that is supposed to have…