Related papers: Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial auctions

We consider a combinatorial auction model where preferences of agents over bundles of objects and payments need not be quasilinear. However, we restrict the preferences of agents to be dichotomous. An agent with dichotomous preference…

Combinatorial auctions are formulated as frustrated lattice gases on sparse random graphs, allowing the determination of the optimal revenue by methods of statistical physics. Transitions between computationally easy and hard regimes are…

Single-shot auctions are commonly used as a means to sell goods, for example when selling ad space or allocating radio frequencies, however devising mechanisms for auctions with multiple bidders and multiple items can be complicated. It has…

In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders can have arbitrary demand and…

Combining two or more items and selling them as one good, a practice called bundling, can be a very effective strategy for reducing the costs of producing, marketing, and selling goods. In this paper, we consider a form of multi-issue…

In recent years, the growing adoption of autobidding has motivated the study of auction design with value-maximizing auto-bidders. It is known that under mild assumptions, uniform bid-scaling is an optimal bidding strategy in truthful…

Retailers have significant potential to improve recommendations through strategic bundling and pricing. By taking into account different types of customers and their purchasing decisions, retailers can better accommodate customer…

A key challenge in combinatorial auctions is designing bid formats that accurately capture agents' preferences while remaining computationally feasible. This is especially true for electricity auctions, where complex preferences complicate…

We study optimal auction design in an independent private values environment where bidders can endogenously -- but at a cost -- improve information about their own valuations. The optimal mechanism is two-stage: at stage-1 bidders register…

While the auto-bidding literature predominantly considers independent bidding, we investigate the coordination problem among multiple auto-bidders in online advertising platforms. Two motivating scenarios are: collaborative bidding among…

This paper studies an environment of simultaneous, separate, first-price auctions for complementary goods. Agents observe private values of each good before making bids, and the complementarity between goods is explicitly incorporated in…

We show that the multiplicative weight update method provides a simple recipe for designing and analyzing optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) auctions, and reduces the time complexity of the problem to pseudo-polynomial in…

LLM-based agents increasingly coordinate decisions in multi-agent systems, often attaching natural-language reasoning to actions. However, reasoning is neither free nor automatically reliable: it incurs computational cost and, without…

We discuss bundle auctions within the framework of an integer allocation problem. We show that for multi-unit auctions, of which bundle auctions are a special case, market equilibrium and constrained market equilibrium are equivalent…

We design a framework for truthful double multi-channel spectrum auctions where each seller (or buyer) can sell (or buy) multiple spectrum channels based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing…

The study of repeated interactions between a learner and a utility-maximizing optimizer has yielded deep insights into the manipulability of learning algorithms. However, existing literature primarily focuses on independent, unlinked…

We study a classic Bayesian mechanism design setting of monopoly problem for an additive buyer in the presence of budgets. In this setting a monopolist seller with $m$ heterogeneous items faces a single buyer and seeks to maximize her…

A multi-product monopolist faces a buyer who is privately informed about his valuations for the goods. As is well-known, optimal mechanisms are in general complicated, while simple mechanisms -- such as pure bundling or separate sales --…

In online advertising, search engines sell ad placements for keywords continuously through auctions. This problem can be seen as an infinitely repeated game since the auction is executed whenever a user performs a query with the keyword. As…

In digital advertising, online platforms allocate ad impressions through real-time auctions, where advertisers typically rely on autobidding agents to optimize bids on their behalf. Unlike traditional auctions for physical goods, the value…