Related papers: Evolutionary Dynamics and the Phase Structure of t…
We study a recently proposed model in which an odd number of agents are competing to be in the minority. The agents have one strategy in hand which is to follow the most recent history. Each agent is also assigned a value p, which is the…
Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as…
We study a version of the minority game in which one agent is allowed to join the game in a random fashion. It is shown that in the crowded regime, i.e., for small values of the memory size $m$ of the agents in the population, the agent…
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…
In this work we propose a kinetic formulation for evolutionary game theory for zero sum games when the agents use mixed strategies. We start with a simple adaptive rule, where after an encounter each agent increases the probability of play…
We study effects of strategy-dependent time delays on equilibria of evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations in dynamical systems. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that microscopic models of…
Perfect synchronicity in $N$-player games is a useful theoretical dream, but communication delays are inevitable and may result in asynchronous interactions. Some systems such as financial markets are asynchronous by design, and yet most…
Trusting in others and reciprocating that trust with trustworthy actions are crucial to successful and prosperous societies. The Trust Game has been widely used to quantitatively study trust and trustworthiness, involving a sequential…
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation has attracted intensive scholarly interest and has been analysed within the framework of evolutionary game theory. The role of innovation, which introduces novel strategies into the population,…
We study the effects of the presence of contrarians in an agent-based model of competing populations. Contrarians are common in societies. These contrarians are agents who deliberately prefer to hold an opinion that is contrary to the…
In this work the properties of multi choice minority games are studied by means of extensive computational simulations. We have considered several ways of rewarding the strategies of the players and compared the resulting behaviours of the…
We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…
Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of reinforcement learning under multi-agent settings has long remained an open problem. While previous works primarily focus on 2-player games, we consider population games, which model the strategic…
In evolutionary game dynamics, reproductive success increases with the performance in an evolutionary game. If strategy $A$ performs better than strategy $B$, strategy $A$ will spread in the population. Under stochastic dynamics, a single…
We show that evolution in a population of adaptive agents, repeatedly competing for a limited resource, can come to an abrupt halt. This transition from evolutionary to non-evolutionary behavior arises as the global resource level is…
The perceived risk and reward for a given situation can vary depending on resource availability, accumulated wealth, and other extrinsic factors such as individual backgrounds. Based on this general aspect of everyday life, here we use…
We consider an integro-differential model for evolutionary game theory which describes the evolution of a population adopting mixed strategies. Using a reformulation based on the first moments of the solution, we prove some analytical…
We present the first study of a dynamical quantum game. Each agent has a `memory' of her performance over the previous m timesteps, and her strategy can evolve in time. The game exhibits distinct regimes of optimality. For small m the…
We model evolution according to an asymmetric game as occurring in multiple finite populations, one for each role in the game, and study the effect of subjecting individuals to stochastic strategy mutations. We show that, when these…
The psychology of the individual is continuously changing in nature, which has a significant influence on the evolutionary dynamics of populations. To study the influence of the continuously changing psychology of individuals on the…