Related papers: Cellular Games
Game dynamics theory, as a field of science, the consistency of theory and experiment is essential. In the past 10 years, important progress has been made in the merging of the theory and experiment in this field, in which dynamics cycle is…
Probabilistic concurrent/distributed strategies have so far not been investigated thoroughly in the context of imperfect information, where the Player has only partial knowledge of the moves made by the Opponent. In a situation where the…
This paper presents new families of algorithms for the repeated play of two-agent (near) zero-sum games and two-agent zero-sum stochastic games. For example, the family includes fictitious play and its variants as members. Commonly, the…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…
We introduce a stochastic cellular automaton as a model for culture and border formation. The model can be conceptualized as a game where the expansion rate of cultures is quantified in terms of their area and perimeter in such a way that…
Hybrid games are models which combine discrete, continuous, and adversarial dynamics. Game logic enables proving (classical) existence of winning strategies. We introduce constructive differential game logic (CdGL) for hybrid games, where…
This work contains the mathematical exploration of a few prototypical games in which central concepts from statistics and probability theory naturally emerge. The first two kinds of games are termed Fisher and Bayesian games, which are…
A class of nonzero-sum stochastic dynamic games with imperfect information structure is investigated. The game involves an arbitrary number of players, modeled as homogeneous Markov decision processes, aiming to find a sequential Nash…
Games on graphs provide a natural and powerful model for reactive systems. In this paper, we consider generalized reachability objectives, defined as conjunctions of reachability objectives. We first prove that deciding the winner in such…
We develop a constrained bimatrix game framework that can be used to model many practical problems in many disciplines, including jamming in packetized wireless networks. In contrast to the widely used zero-sum framework, in bimatrix games…
We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…
We provide several tests to determine whether a game is a potential game or whether it is a zero-sum equivalent game---a game which is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game in the same way that a potential game is strategically…
We consider strategic games that are inspired by Schelling's model of residential segregation. In our model, the agents are partitioned into k types and need to select locations on an undirected graph. Agents can be either stubborn, in…
We define and study a few properties of a class of random automata networks. While regular finite one-dimensional cellular automata are defined on periodic lattices, these automata networks, called randomized cellular automata, are defined…
We define a notion of morphisms between open games, exploiting a surprising connection between lenses in computer science and compositional game theory. This extends the more intuitively obvious definition of globular morphisms as mappings…
Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…
We introduce games with probabilistic uncertainty, a natural model for controller synthesis in which the controller observes the state of the system through imprecise sensors that provide correct information about the current state with a…
We examine a two-person game we call Will-Testing in which the strategy space for both players is a real number. It has no equilibrium. When an infinitely large set of players plays this in all possible pairings, there is an equilibrium for…
Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…
We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…