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Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…
We study learning by privately informed forward-looking agents in a simple repeated-action setting of social learning. Under a symmetric signal structure, forward-looking agents behave myopically for any degrees of patience. Myopic…
Political messages increasingly bundle economic policy arguments with moral social policy stances. Using survey experiments with roughly 6,500 U.S. adults, I show that such bundling sharply weakens economic persuasion among respondents who…
Given an endogenous timescale set by invasion in a constant environment, we introduced periodic temporal variation in competitive superiority by alternating the species' propagation rates. By manipulating habitat size and introduction rate,…
I consider deterministic distinguishability of a set of orthogonal, bipartite states when only a single copy is available and the parties are restricted to local operations and classical communication, but with the additional requirement…
We model dynamically changing candidate positions in the face of a dynamic electorate. To formulate our equations, we use a space-time-continuous Hegselmann-Krause equation, which we solve using a particle method. We use the combined…
Why do division and cohesion often intensify together? This paper develops a static structural theory of relation maintenance based on minimal positional constraints. Rather than relying on utility-based or probabilistic models, social…
We consider an inhomogeneous symmetric simple exclusion process on a one-dimensional lattice with open boundary conditions. The time scale is continuous. Particles of different types arrive to the utmost left and the utmost right site. If a…
We investigate opinion dynamics in a fully-connected system, consisting of $n$ identical and anonymous agents, where one of the opinions (which is called correct) represents a piece of information to disseminate. In more detail, one source…
In the asymmetric simple exclusion process on the integers each particle waits exponential time, then with probability p it moves one step to the right if the site is unoccupied, otherwise it stays put; and with probability q=1-p it moves…
Dispersal is an important strategy that allows organisms to locate and exploit favorable habitats. The question arises: given competition in a spatially heterogeneous landscape, what is the optimal rate of dispersal? Continuous population…
An assembly of $n$ voters needs to decide on $t$ independent binary issues. Each voter has opinions about the issues, given by a $t$-bit vector. Anscombe's paradox shows that a policy following the majority opinion in each issue may not…
We consider synchronous iterative voting, where voters are given the opportunity to strategically choose their ballots depending on the outcome deduced from the previous collective choices.We propose two settings for synchronous iterative…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits indifferences. We present a novel decomposition of strategyproofness into three…
We introduce an asymmetric noisy voter model to study the joint effect of immigration and a competition-dispersal tradeoff in the dynamics of two species competing for space in regular lattices. Individuals of one species can invade a…
We study the setting of committee elections, where a group of individuals needs to collectively select a given size subset of available objects. This model is relevant for a number of real-life scenarios including political elections,…
We model an electorate voting on the funding of a public good in a two-party system in an evolutionary game theory framework. Voters adopt one of four strategies: Consensus-makers, Gridlockers, Party 1 Zealots, and Party 2 Zealots, which…
Apportionment is the act of distributing the seats of a legislature among political parties (or states) in proportion to their vote shares (or populations). A famous impossibility by Balinski and Young (2001) shows that no apportionment…
In this paper we show that when individuals in a bipartite network exclusively choose partners and exchange valued goods with their partners, then there exists a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable. Pair-wise stability implies that…