Related papers: Facility Location Mechanism Design: Breaking The D…
During initial iterations of training in most Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms, agents perform a significant number of random exploratory steps. In the real world, this can limit the practicality of these algorithms as it can lead to…
In this paper, we investigate the $k$-Facility Location Problem ($k$-FLP) within the Bayesian Mechanism Design framework, in which agents' preferences are samples of a probability distributed on a line. Our primary contribution is…
We propose a method for analyzing the distributed random coordinate descent algorithm for solving separable resource allocation problems in the context of an open multiagent system, where agents can be replaced during the process. In…
A systematic technique to bound factor-revealing linear programs is presented. We show how to derive a family of upper bound factor-revealing programs (UPFRP), and show that each such program can be solved by a computer to bound the…
We study facility location problems where agents control multiple locations and when reporting their locations can choose to hide some locations (hiding), report some locations more than once (replication) and lie about their locations…
We study a joint facility location and cost planning problem in a competitive market under random utility maximization (RUM) models. The objective is to locate new facilities and make decisions on the costs (or budgets) to spend on the new…
The recent large scale availability of mobility data, which captures individual mobility patterns, poses novel operational problems that are exciting and challenging. Motivated by this, we introduce and study a variant of the…
In this paper, we give the first constant approximation algorithm for the lower bounded facility location (LBFL) problem with general lower bounds. Prior to our work, such algorithms were only known for the special case where all facilities…
We initiate the study of the heterogeneous facility location problem with limited resources. We mainly focus on the fundamental case where a set of agents are positioned in the line segment [0,1] and have approval preferences over two…
It is quite challenging to ensure the safety of reinforcement learning (RL) agents in an unknown and stochastic environment under hard constraints that require the system state not to reach certain specified unsafe regions. Many popular…
Enterprise deployment of long-horizon decision agents in regulated domains (underwriting, claims adjudication, tax examination) is dominated by retrieval-augmented pipelines despite a decade of increasingly sophisticated stateful memory…
This paper explores the Mechanism Design aspects of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem where the total facility capacity is less than the number of agents. Following the framework outlined by Aziz et al., the Social Welfare of…
We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of…
This paper studies the performative prediction problem which optimizes a stochastic loss function with data distribution that depends on the decision variable. We consider a setting where the agent(s) provides samples adapted to the…
The maximization of reach-avoid probabilities for stochastic systems is a central topic in the control literature. Yet, the available methods are either restricted to low-dimensional systems or suffer from conservative approximations. To…
In the last years we have witnessed the appearance of a variety of strategies to design optimal location privacy-preserving mechanisms, in terms of maximizing the adversary's expected error with respect to the users' whereabouts. In this…
An important feature of many real world facility location problems are capacity limits on the facilities. We show here how capacity constraints make it harder to design strategy proof mechanisms for facility location, but…
Dynamic mechanism design studies how mechanism designers should allocate resources among agents in a time-varying environment. We consider the problem where the agents interact with the mechanism designer according to an unknown Markov…
We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility…
This paper considers a scenario within the field of mechanism design without money where a mechanism designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a knapsack constraint. The items, however, are controlled by…