Related papers: Formal Verification of Probing Security via Condit…
Side-channel attacks, which are capable of breaking secrecy via side-channel information, pose a growing threat to the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Masking is an effective countermeasure against side-channel attacks by…
In this paper, we consider the problem of verifying anonymity and unlinkability in the symbolic model, where protocols are represented as processes in a variant of the applied pi calculus, notably used in the ProVerif tool. Existing tools…
In this work we investigate the problem of simultaneous privacy and integrity protection in cryptographic circuits. We consider a white-box scenario with a powerful, yet limited attacker. A concise metric for the level of probing and fault…
Non-interference is a program property that ensures the absence of information leaks. In the context of programming languages, there exist two common approaches for establishing non-interference: type systems and program logics. Type…
Power side-channel attacks, which can deduce secret data via statistical analysis, have become a serious threat. Masking is an effective countermeasure for reducing the statistical dependence between secret data and side-channel…
Separation logic is a substructural logic which has proved to have numerous and fruitful applications to the verification of programs working on dynamic data structures. Recently, Barthe, Hsu and Liao have proposed a new way of giving…
Probabilistic independence is a useful concept for describing the result of random sampling---a basic operation in all probabilistic languages---and for reasoning about groups of random variables. Nevertheless, existing verification methods…
Integrated circuit (IC) piracy and overproduction are serious issues that threaten the security and integrity of a system. Logic locking is a type of hardware obfuscation technique where additional key gates are inserted into the circuit.…
Cryptographic protocols play a fundamental role in securing modern digital infrastructure, but they are often deployed without prior formal verification. This could lead to the adoption of distributed systems vulnerable to attack vectors.…
Measuring the information leakage is critical for evaluating the practical security of cryptographic devices against side-channel analysis. Information-theoretic measures can be used (along with Fano's inequality) to derive upper bounds on…
We present Lilac, a separation logic for reasoning about probabilistic programs where separating conjunction captures probabilistic independence. Inspired by an analogy with mutable state where sampling corresponds to dynamic allocation, we…
Proof by coupling is a classical proof technique for establishing probabilistic properties of two probabilistic processes, like stochastic dominance and rapid mixing of Markov chains. More recently, couplings have been investigated as a…
Side channel attacks have emerged as a serious threat to the security of both networked and embedded systems -- in particular through the implementations of cryptographic operations. Side channels can be difficult to model formally, but…
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is an important enabling technology for data privacy in modern distributed applications. Currently, proof methods for low-level MPC protocols are primarily manual and thus tedious and error-prone, and…
We present verification methods for logic programs with delay declarations. The verified properties are termination and freedom from errors related to built-ins. Concerning termination, we present two approaches. The first approach tries to…
We propose a methodology for verifying security properties of network protocols at design level. It can be separated in two main parts: context and requirements analysis and informal verification; and formal representation and procedural…
Existing logic-locking attacks are known to successfully decrypt functionally correct key of a locked combinational circuit. It is possible to extend these attacks to real-world Silicon-based Intellectual Properties (IPs, which are…
Formal verification is crucial for ensuring the robustness of security protocols against adversarial attacks. The Needham-Schroeder protocol, a foundational authentication mechanism, has been extensively studied, including its integration…
Existing program verifiers can prove advanced properties about security protocol implementations, but are difficult to scale to large codebases because of the manual effort required. We develop a novel methodology called *Diodon* that…
Logic locking as a solution for semiconductor intellectual property (IP) confidentiality has received considerable attention in academia, but has yet to produce a viable solution to protect against known threats. In part due to a lack of…